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ABSTRACT
Neoliberal development proponents argue that the rule of law is essential for achieving
economic development. It demands adjusting legislative and legal institutional practices
to enforce and protect market operations, and the minimizing of state intervention. The
IFIs and the developed states adopted this development approach in dealing with
developing states through conditional-based lending. Through attaching structural
regulative adjustments and the reformation of juristic institutions as preconditions to
their fiscal assistance, the IFIs, influenced by the developed states, were able to impose
a system of legal economic governance over the developing economies. Across the
different development stages, developing states who did not follow the neoliberal
development approach managed to achieve greater economic growth in comparison to
those who followed it. This paper analyses the rule of law through the different
development phases starting in the 1950s till the 2000s. It assesses their interaction with
the different economic development paradigms. It defines the techniques and outcomes
of adopting the rule of law by the main development actors, mainly the developed and
developing states, the IFIs, and the international economic order. It evaluates the
essentiality of the rule of law for achieving economic prosperity as a central neoliberal
claim. As a case study, this thesis charts the economic transformation of the Egyptian
economy from state-led to market-oriented as an economic adjustment transformation
that was supervised by the IFIs. The paper argues that, despite the implementation of
the rule of law in Egypt as required by the IFIs, the expected economic development
was not achieved. Based on such study, this paper undermines the essentiality of the
rule of law for economic development and deems it as a neoliberal instrument for
economic governance rather than a prerequisite for development.
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I.

Introduction

From the ashes of two World Wars, a new global order based, theoretically, on the
separation of political conflicts from economic interests was created. This new order
was, since the beginning, based on the discrimination between countries which
described themselves as developed while considering others as inferior, needy
developing countries. The developed states adopted a holistic vision of advancing
those who are underdeveloped, by prescribing medicines for economic illnesses and
catalysts for economic growth and prosperity. Those were the features on which the
new international order was founded. A system that was built on fictitious sympathy
and charity between the wealthy nations and the poor ones. The IFIs are among the
main actors in that new economic order. As they are the experts in development and
the channel through which economic and developmental knowledge are transferred
from the most expert nations to the least. Nevertheless, the developing countries never
approached their economic objectives of becoming the same as the developed world
despite adhering to the economic policies of the IFIs since their establishment.
The economic polarity between the East and the West ignited competition between the
two dominant poles in seducing the developing nations’ economies. The IFIs played
the role of the economic messengers of the West, while the Eastern Bloc did not have
such institutional capabilities. However, after the dominance and prevalence of the
Western model and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relations between the
developed nations, especially the United States, and the developing states were no
longer based on compassion as before; if it ever truly existed. Nonetheless, it shifted
toward achieving greater economic success and capital accumulation at the expense of
the developing nations.1 This was not through use of force as before, but through other
types of coercion, namely legal ones. The rule of law has become the technique
through which economic dominance is assured for the West. Hence, international
rules were designed for the governance of the international economic order.

1

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Interview, 11 GLOBALIZATIONS, 473-480 (2014) 11, available at
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747731.2014.951207 .

Meanwhile, domestic complementary legal norms are being implanted in the
developing states’ legal systems by several methods; mainly, IFI conditionality.
Covered by noble developmental schema, such as the one that Amartya Sen advocates
for from the outside,2 and due to forceful economic needs, the IFIs’ economic models
have found their way into most of the developing countries’ systems. From the inside,
it is motivated by a wild, unmerciful, neoliberal, capitalistic desire that craves the
control and monopolization of resources. The reliance on the rule of law is a strategic
choice for development scholars since the legal norm possesses some distinct features
that do not exist in any other type of norms. As Kennedy indicated, a legal norm is a
very effective tool of governance that possesses the ability to shape economic policy
design on the one hand, and ensures the outcomes of different economic operations on
the other.3 A legal norm can impose noble virtues such as justice, fair distribution, and
the protection of rights. Nevertheless, and contrary to what may be perceived,
morality is not an integral part of its design. This permits its utilization for the
complete opposite of the previously stated virtues.
The rule of law that this paper discusses was subject to different structural changes
that gave it the characteristics of being economically efficient to the extent of its
supersession of other contradicting values and norms. The economic aspect, in this
version of the rule of law, incorporated other social interests such as equality, rights,
justice, and fair distribution to be either factors for its implementation, or secondary
objectives. Yet, economic interests are the main and ultimate end of its
implementation. Social values and rights proponents did not have the power to
influence its creation, as Anghie expresses.4 Yet, a pertinent question to be asked is
whether the rule of law is essential for economic dominance or economic
development? The answer to that question differs depending on which side is asking;
the Western states and the IFIs, or the developing countries. The former will regard it
as an emancipatory means for the improvement of the economic conditions of the
latter. Whereas the latter will identify it as a system of dominance that resembles

2

See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Alfred Knopf) (1999).
David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Law and Economics with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions
for Promoting Development in the Twenty-First Century30-38, (Oxford University Press) (2013).
4
Antony Anghie, Whose Utopia? Human Rights, Development, and the Third World, 22 Qui Parle, 63
(2013).
3
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colonization for the purpose of taking over their resources. Consequently, this
research aims at exploring to what extent the rule of law, as a neoliberal requirement
that is advocated by IFI policies, is necessary for the achievement of economic
development. For the purpose of this paper, Egypt is selected as a case study as one of
the developing countries which relied on the neoliberal economic policies adopted by
the IFIs to implement its transition and seek better economic conditions.
This paper also questions the development model that was set by the IFIs, which was
enforced by conditionality, and implemented by Egypt during its financial crisis in the
1990s. Through the implementation of neoliberal development strategies, Egypt
became one of the post-war/colonial economic system’s victims. Not by force, but
through the rule of law, the current unjust economic order is being coercively applied
to developing countries. The World Bank and the IMF perform a significant role in
such global injustice through interference in the internal polices of the developing
member states, by obliging these states to commit economic suicide through
engagement in the biased international trade and investment systems. This raises
doubts about the objectives of the current international economic system in general,
and the project of development in particular, which is constantly presented with
different interfaces to developing states.
In order to do so, the following chapter shall consider the international economic
order after the establishment of the Bretton Wood financial organizations, and their
neoliberal economic development strategies. It indicates their economic objectives,
political restrictions, decision making processes, and the evolution of their scope of
operations from financial assistance to policy-making through the rule of law. Chapter
three of this paper tracks how the rule of law is being integrated in the different
development stages starting from post-World War II and the establishment of the
Bretton Woods system, till the 2000s, and the changes in the role of the state in
response to this different integration. Chapter four presents the economic transition of
Egypt as a case study for transformation from a socialist planned economy to a
neoliberal market system, through following the World Bank and the IMF’s economic
policies. In this regard, the paper shall explore such neoliberal influences on the rule
of law in Egypt with regard to both the regulatory and the institutional levels. The
Egyptian investment law will be the model on which the neoliberal influences will be

3

traced, while the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court will be the institutional
application for the rule of law. This paper additionally reviews the results of the
application of the IFI’s structural economic adjustments in Egypt.

4

II.
The Establishment and Mandates of the World Bank and the
IMF vs. their Practical Application
One of the main features of the new international order after World War II was the
separation between the political and economic interests of states. This separation has
existed since the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods financial
institutions. This chapter will present a background on the establishment of these
institutions, with a special focus on the Bretton Woods institutions, since the UN is
beyond the scope of this paper. Then it defines the objectives, political limitations,
decision making, and the scope of operation of these financial institutions. Lastly, it
demonstrates how this new international order magnified the role of these institutions
through the powers of globalization.
A. Background on the Establishment of the IFIs and their Role within the
International Order
Post-World War II, and in support for Truman’s historic speech in 1949,5 two major
international institutional structures were created to practice international political and
economic governance. For international economic interests, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – known as the Bretton Woods institutions – were
created in 1944. In 1945, the United Nations was created after the San Francisco
conference for international political interests.6 Secular international political and
economic hubs were essential for the accommodation of all states in one place despite
their political and economic conflicts. It was an opportunity, especially for states other
than the great powers, to have a platform that would enable them to address other
nations in the world. In addition, the separation between the political and economic
concerns increased the engagement of states as their political and sovereign integrity
were not to be touched, while conflict in economic interests was to be negotiated. The
two international entities were tasked with imposing a system of governance that
involved channels for dispute resolution on the one hand, and to realize the interests of
the states on the other, without resorting to the use of force.

5

JASON HICKEL, THE DIVIDE, A BRIEF GUIDE TO GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND ITS SOLUTIONS 13, (2017).
Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth, and the Politics
of Universality, (William Heinemann) (2011).
6
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Such institutionalization contributed to creating a set of internationally recognized
norms that became recognized as international law later on.7 These internationally
recognized norms acquired their enforceability through the imposition of the
characteristics of the legal rule. Accordingly, these rules enjoyed the same features of
an ordinary legal norm, being abstract, impartial, and coercive. The establishment of
such norms at the international level unified the applicable rules to all member states
whether for political or economic interests. The theoretical separation between the
United Nations as a political organization, and the World Bank and the IMF, as
economic ones, resulted in the separation between the rules that govern both political
and economic interests as well. This new order distinguished norms that states are
required to respect and implement. It also established authoritative international
references that were granted the competence to decide what is just and what is not on
the international stage, on the one hand, and what is political and what is not on the
other.
After the Second World War, states were categorized according to their economic
strength and advancement. The developed world was the one that possessed the
economic and productive capabilities; while the developing world was the one that
needed economic assistance to become developed.8 This assistance was supposed to
be offered through the newly established secular economic arms of the developed
nations. Whether through consultancy or financial aid, the Bretton Woods institutions
were entitled to contribute to the development of the least developed nations. The
newly established system was based on the differentiation between the advanced
nations and the “backward” ones that lacked the requirements to be considered
developed.9 Additionally, it was oriented by the conception of development as an
economic objective to be administrated by the World Bank and the IMF.10The World
Bank and the IMF’s mandates indicate the objectives of the two institutions, and their
mutual relations with the member states. Nevertheless, the manner by which these
financial institutions performed their role signified how they overstepped their limits

7

Supra note 6.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
8
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by intervening in the policy-making of the member states, which was restricted, as
will be demonstrated, within their articles of agreement.
B. The Mandates of the World Bank and the IMF, the Political Limitations,
and Decision Making
Each of the two financial institutions has its own mandate that decides the frame of
their operations. While both institutions are concerned with international economic
interests in association with the states, each one approaches such economic needs
from a different angle. Both institutions have 189 member states,11 and both
institutions are entitled to assist member states with economic difficulties by means of
financial assistance and consultations.12 It is also important to note that both
institutions became specialized agencies of the United Nations.
1. Organizational Structure
Unlike the IMF, the World Bank has many suborganizations. The main two are the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International
Development Association (IDA). In addition, the World Bank Group includes the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), each as a separate legal entity.13 For the purpose of this paper, the focus will
be on IBRD, IDA, and ICSID.
2. Objectives
The objective of the IBRD is to: (i) assist in the reconstruction and development of
the member states’ territories by encouraging capital investment, restoring economies
that were affected by wars, and motivating development in less developed countries;
(ii) promote private foreign investment, and to substitute its absence through financing
productive objectives on suitable conditions; (iii) promote long-term balanced growth
of international trade, and the encouragement of international investment in order to

11

See the World Bank’s member states, available at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members. For the IMF, available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm.
12
See, scope of operations of the IMF within its articles of agreement, available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
13
See the organizational structural of the World Bank, available at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit.
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raise the standard of living and the labor conditions of member states; (iv) arrange
loans for urgent and useful projects; (v) operate with regard to the effect of
international investment on the member states territories after periods of war, in order
to ensure the peaceful transition from a wartime to peacetime economy.14 The
objective of the IDA, as indicated in Article I of its mandate, is to endorse economic
development and to increase productivity and the standard of living of the less
developed areas of the world. This is to be achieved through financing important and
more flexible development requirements in order to decrease the pressure of the
balance of payments of member states, complementing the role played by the IBRD.15
On the other hand, the IMF has mainly a macroeconomic objective. The IMF is tasked
with stabilizing the international monetary system through assisting member states.
This is done by either offering loans or consultations, in order to adjust their balance
of payments and to fix their exchange rates. The IMF is also meant to monitor and
ensure the consistency of member states’ currency par values, and to provide financial
support in case of the instability of the balance of payments.16
3. Decision-Making
With regard to decision making within the World Bank and the IMF, it reflects the
contributions of donating nations since it is a weighted voting system.17 Both
institutions have a board of governors in which each member has the right to be
represented. This representation takes place by appointment, either the minister of
finance or the governor of the central bank of each member state.18 As for the IMF,
most of the board’s powers are delegated to the twenty-four members of the Board of
Executives, with exception to some significant decisions. Decisions concerning
admitting a new member, making quota adjustments, and amending the articles of
agreement are reserved to the Board of Governance.19 With regard to voting, decisions

See, Article I of the IBRD’s article of agreement, available at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-I.
15
See, the IDA articles of agreement, available at
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/341581541440486864/IDAArticlesofAgreementEnglish.pdf.
16
See, the IMF articles of agreement, available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
17
Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L., 199, 211 (2004).
18
Daniel Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, (1996).
19
Id.
14
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can be made by simple majority, or in certain cases a majority of 85%, as in the case
of quota adjustment.20 The United States has around 17% of the total vote, and has the
right to veto decisions. As for the World Bank, the United States possesses around
15% of the total vote; while both China and India, which are the most populated states
in the world, have around 3% of the voting power combined.21 The World Bank also
has a board of executive directors that run day-to-day tasks,22 which is relatively
smaller than the IMF’s Executive Board.23
4. Political Restrictions
Both the mandates of the IBRD and IDA stipulate that,
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of
any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the
political character of the member or members concerned. Only
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the
purposes stated in Article I.24
As for the member states, the World Bank’s mandate indicates that,
The member states shall respect the international character of these
organizations and refrain from seeking to influence the officials of
these organizations who owe their primary duty of loyalty to the
organization.25
Accordingly, the articles of agreement of the World Bank require mutual restriction of
influence between the organization and its member states and to consider only the
objectives of the organization that was established without bias. This separation
between the developmental objectives of the World Bank and the political interests of
its members, especially the United States, is hard to imagine; given the influence of

20

Supra note 18.
Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions,
and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL., 1 (1999); See also for the United States’ veto in the
World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/unitedstates/overview; For the IMF, see
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10676.pdf.
22
Id. at 264.
23
Supra note 18.
24
Supra note 18, at 53.
25
Id. See also, the World Bank articles of agreement, available at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement.
21
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the latter within the organization, and its implications on economic policy-making
with regard to developing member states.
Unlike the Bank, the IMF’s mandate does not include a provision that clearly restricts
interference in the political affairs of member states.26 Nevertheless, Article IV of the
mandate indicates that the IMF should, “respect the domestic social and political
policies and in applying these principles… pay due regard to the circumstances of
members”.27 The IMF recognized this article as a restriction against interfering in
member states’ internal political affairs.28 Similarly, as with the World Bank, the
concern that this article invoked is also debatable because of the recent policy reform
role that the IMF performed within developing states, which will be discussed later
on.29
In this regard, neither the World Bank’s mandate nor the IMF’s define what is to be
considered “political”. In addition, and especially with regard to the World Bank, the
mandates do not define the exact framework for using terms such as “economic” or
“development”. These terms are the core of what the World Bank and the IMF do, yet
they are not well defined in either theory or practice. In that regard, both institutions
reserve the right to interpret their articles of agreements to their boards only.30
Accordingly, other parties’ interpretations, even authorized legal ones, do not count or
bind. The reason for the lack of decisiveness could be to avoid restricting these
institutions, while leaving the decision as to the appropriate way of interference to
their judgments, or to direct the institutions to adopt the definitions and the scope of
interpretations of those terms in the manner that they are internationally accepted.31
This unclarity makes it difficult to determine what to include or exclude from the
political sphere and the scope of operations of these institutions. As a consequence,
the provisional restrictions indicated in the mandates of both institutions are thought
to be useless, since how can one restrict the undefined? However, from the

26

Supra note 21.
Supra note 18; See also, the IMF articles of agreement, available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.\.
28
Supra note 18.
29
The scope of IMF operations will be discussed in the next part while tackling the Scope of the IFIs
operations.
30
Anghie, supra note 21, at 270.
31
Supra note 18.
27
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institutional point of view, both the Bank and the IMF are acting in accordance with
their economic objectives on the one hand, and member state needs on the other.
Such practice was undisputed since their establishment till the 1970s, during which
many economic twists took place. The oil crisis in the 1970s, the debt crisis in the
1980s, and the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s changed the way economics is
perceived.32 Accordingly, the foundational concepts of achieving economic
development also have changed with the rise of neoliberal economics. The border
between economics, development, law, and policy began to vanish starting from this
period. The IFIs adopted a new economic approach within their operations, by
including in their scope a state’s internal governance systems as an essential element
for economic development and stability.
Both institutions expanded the scope of their operations through adopting policybased lending or conditionality, as will be demonstrated in the coming sections. The
new approach required the implementation of structural adjustment with regard to the
economic policies of the developing member states in order to adjust their mode of
governance. The rule of law became an integral part of IFI policies, on which their
development strategies were based starting in the 1970s. Many scholars criticized this
expansion in the scope of operations of these financial institutions and considered it
against their articles of agreement, which will be considered in the next section.
C. The Operational Evolution of the IFI, the SAP, and Political Accusations
The scope of operations of the IFIs will be reviewed over three periods. The first is
before the adoption of the structural adjustments. The second is during its adoption,
while the last period is operations post-SAP policy.
1. Prior to the SAP (1950s-60s)
The World Bank and the IMF were performing a complementary economic function
that mainly focused on the internal economic development of the member states as a
micro objective, and the steadiness of the world trade and financial order as a macro

32

JOHN RAPLEY, UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE THIRD WORLD, (2nd
ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.) (2002).
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one.33 In its initial operations, the World Bank’s main focus was to fund
developmental projects upon the request of member states. The World Bank studied
such projects and determined their feasibility. If a given project was recognized as
feasible, then the World Bank would lend the member state the required financial
assistance for implementation. The World Bank would also monitor how these funds
were spent in order to ensure the proper employment of the funds as previously agreed
with the member state. The feasibility of the project has two main aspects. The first is
related to the developmental value that it added to the national economy of the
member state. The other is related to the capacity of the member state to repay the
debt to the World Bank.34 The IMF grants member states financial support for the
adjustment of their fiscal policies after conducting the required studies, in order to
ensure the required budget’s monetary balance. Development was mainly about useful
productive projects and the correct monetary policy. The rule of law was not within
the scope of development or for IFI operations during this phase.
Nevertheless, the scope of operations of the BWIs expanded dramatically after the
reassessment of their old operations.35 The evaluation of the project’s lending policies
was not satisfactory for the management of the IFIs. In addition, the high level of
economic fluctuation required the adoption of more effective and decisive policies.36
Accordingly, the BWIs abandoned their old development strategies that were based on
the Keynesian economic model. These strategies mainly focused on increasing
production, such as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). The new strategies
adopted a liberal approach which tended toward trade liberalization and the free flow
of investment. The BWIs also shifted from project-based to policy-based lending,
which was presented in the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). This shift was
based, in theory, on amending structural deformations within the recipient states as a
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more efficient way of allocating the funds, and to ensure developmental progress
through the rule of law.37
2. Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) approach (1970s – 80s)
The idea behind the SAP program was to eliminate the structural obstacles that disable
the proper function of a market-oriented economy.38 This implies the creation of an
appropriate environment that involve SAP elements, which are fiscal austerity and
disinflation policies, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, trade liberalization,
currency devaluation, liberalization of foreign investments, and economic
deregulation. These elements soon became the conditions upon which BWIs
constructed their financial assistance. The developing countries that needed IFI
financial assistance had to agree to the SAP.39 Unlike previously, countries that did
not rely on or need financial assistance from the IFIs, mainly in South Asia, had the
freedom to decide their economic strategies. Those countries, despite being
developing ones, managed to achieve high economic progress in comparison to the
countries following a SAP as an economic strategy.
The program fundamentally altered the developing states’ economic policies towards
a market-oriented system.40 It was the beginning of reliance on the rule of law with
regard to the IFIs’ operations. It entailed legislative amendments in order to transform
state policy from state-led to market oriented. Law was regarded as an element of
economic development, as will be further discussed in Chapter Three. Opening up to
market forces was not in the best interest of these developing countries. On the
contrary, it was in the best interests of the developed countries who ruled both the
market and the IFIs.41 The SAP development strategy did not perform well within the
developing countries. It increased poverty levels within those countries and promoted
inequalities. It is worth noting here that Turkey and Mexico were the first countries to
implement SAPs in order to receive financial assistance from the IFIs in the early
1980s.42 The implementation of the program caused collateral damages to the states
37
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which undertook it, as in Latin America and Africa, as it depended on cutting down
public spending on important sectors within the state.4344 The SAP program was
criticized for decreasing public spending, unequal distribution of wealth because of
privatization, and harsh monetary requirements that all contributed to increased
poverty rates due to the lack of social protection.45As a consequence, and under
pressure from criticism and weak results, the IFIs changed their older policy, in an
attempt to take into account the destructive social implications of the SAP, in what
was later known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
3. Post SAP: The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and Good
Governance (1990s – 2000s)
The PRSP was not much different as a development program from the SAP. It merely
had a more holistic form.46 The program aimed at structural reform of the recipient
state’s economic policies, by liberalizing key economic sectors to attract private and
foreign capital, and encourage free trade. The theory behind the program was that
such flows of investment would have a “trickle down” effect on the population, which
would alleviate poverty automatically.47 The program involved more interference with
the economic policies of the recipient states and more conditionalities.48 Nonetheless,
it was postulated as an attempt to strike a balance between maintaining a free
liberalized market and increasing spending on important sectors, such as health and
education, through shifting public expenditure from subsidies to these sectors. The
program had a strong reliance on the rule of law and legal institutional practice. The
rule of law was regarded as a fundamental element in order to achieve development.
Law and the reform of legal institutions were an end in themselves for the IFIs’
development agenda, and for neoliberal development in general.49
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In that regard, two major events took place that also had a great influence on the
developing economic policies and behavior of the BWIs. The first was the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1989, while the second was the Washington Consensus in 1990.
The collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the market-oriented approach. This
strengthened the position of the Bretton Woods institutions in addition to the terms
and conditions of their loans to developing states. Such a collapse was a clear
indicator of the failure of the planned economy and marked the success of the liberal
market alternative. As for the Washington Consensus, it was a recipe that was adopted
by the World Bank, the IMF, and the United States Treasury for developing countries,
and which was named and introduced by Joan Williamson as the “Washington
Consensus”.50 The consensus was constructed of ten economic policy
recommendations that developing countries should follow in order to strengthen their
economies. These ten polices were as follows: (i) reducing government deficits
through fiscal discipline; (ii) shifting public expenditure from subsidies to health,
education, and infrastructure for the sake of the disadvantaged; (iii) tax reforms
through establishing a broad tax base and moderate marginal rates; (iv) liberalizing
interest rates through reducing government interference; (v) increase the flexibility of
the exchange rate, (vi) trade liberalization; (vii) inward foreign direct investment
liberalization; (viii) privatization of state-owned enterprises; (ix) deregulating market
operation and competition and; (x) enhancing property rights.51 This consensus soon
became the new conditions required for receiving financial assistance from the IFIs.
The new policies of the Bretton Woods institutions required a change in the way the
recipient state is governed.52 It involved introducing regulatory adjustments to the
governance system of the developing state in order to be able to achieve the
prospected economic objectives through the methods of good governance. In this
regard, in comparing between the SAP and the new adopted economic policies, “the
former, governance connoted the effective implementation of policies of economic
liberalization while in the latter, there is greater emphasis on governance as an
instrument to promote the regulative capacities of the state.”53 As a consequence of
50
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such change, these financial institutions, by using their lending powers, imposed
pressure on developing states to radically change their economic model, especially
given the lack of economic alternatives.54 Moreover, along with trade liberalization
and the facilitation of transnational flows of foreign capital policies initiated by the
SAP program, the economic vulnerability of the recipient state increased and made it
subject to economic exploitation by developed states. Under the flag of the rule of
law, economic liberalization was taking place and dismantling state control over the
market and protecting its operations from state interventions. Above all, the failure of
any of the objectives of the SAP was always attributed to the state’s inadequate
governance.55 The role of the state in post-SAP policy was to safeguard market
operations in order to enhance investments and the free flow of capital. Another
important role was to establish and utilize local politicians and decision makers for the
continuity of the liberalization process.56
4. Criticism of Policy-Based Lending
The operation of the IFIs came under strict scrutiny after the Asian financial crisis in
1997-1998, the collapse of the Argentinian economy in 2001,57and the remarkable
progress achieved by East Asia in comparison to other post-war developing countries
who followed the unconstrained liberalization model and depended on the free flow of
foreign investments.58 Conditionality was regarded as a severe interference within the
domestic policies of the recipient member states. Despite the political restrictions
within the mandates of both the World Bank and the IMF, the broadening of the scope
of operations of the BWIs rendered such limitations ineffective. This is not to mention
the vague and elastic interpretation of what is considered political and what is
economic. The coercive implementation of the neoliberal model in return for financial
assistance was considered by many a breach of the IFIs’ articles of agreement. The
dramatic expansion in the scope of operations of both the World Bank and the IMF
clearly interfered with the domestic political affairs of the recipient states. IFIs were
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accused by many scholars of political bias towards the developed states by facilitating
their control over the developing states’ resources.59
It was clear from the economic performance of the BWIs their tendency towards the
Western economic model. This could be demonstrated since its establishment and its
attempts to seduce developing nations to become part of the Western economic lobby
in the 1950s in opposition to Soviet influence.60 Accordingly, the establishment of
IFIs had an implied political role since the start of its operations.61 It was also obvious
how these financial institutions, after the expansion of their operations in many states,
possessed great influence and significant bargaining power in dealing with developing
states in desperate need of their financial assistance. Utilizing such power was clearly
noted through the imposition of structural adjustment reforms within the recipient
states, as developing states had limited options with regard to economic and fiscal
assistance. The implementation of these programs clearly benefited the developed
states and disadvantaged the developing ones, ensuring the continuity of the financial
dominance of the former over the latter’s resources. This is not to mention the
demolition of the developing states’ attempts to establish a new economic order
(NIEO) through more trade liberalization, more reliance on foreign investments, and
lastly coercively orienting their domestic economic policies into adopting such
principles.62
The weighted voting system within the BWIs clearly serves the economic interests of
the West. The United States alone has around 17% of the voting power within the
boards of these institutions, not to mention the right to veto decisions,63 hiding behind
the functionality approach of the mandates of these institutions which deny such
influence. Yet, the practical application of their economic programs indicates
59
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otherwise.64 Through the enforcement of liberalizing structural changes in the
developing states’ economic policies, the international economic order became
predominantly one that normalized Western domination over the resources of
developing nations. The developed states never gave up their control over economic
resources within the colonized developing states. A neocolonial order was being
established through the instrumentalization of the BWIs as a long economic arm that
had access to domestic economic policy making within other states. A neocolonial
administration that is armed by the formalism of legal norms through the rule of law
and the powers of globalization to maintain its prevalence.

Figure 1: Trends in GDP per capita in selected developing regions, 1970-199065

Figure 2: Annual average growth of GDP in developing regions, 1971-199066
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D. The Powers of Globalization in Internalizing and Internationalizing the
Legal Norm
International law plays a great role in the current global economic order. The main
actor in this regard is globalization. Globalization of international standards and
economic trends exerts pressures on developing states in order to meet its demands, as
such states are committed to carrying out international obligations imposed by
international treaties and declarations. The developing states’ right to develop is
initially constrained by these obligations and further still by the prescriptions of the
financial institutions if their assistance is required. The IFIs do not include in their
calculations the international factors that might devastate development efforts within
developing states in their economic development equations.67 Nevertheless, as Anghie
indicates, the burden will always be on the state to make structural reforms in order to
be compatible with the international institutional demands in order to become
normalized within the system.68 As a result, states will have to bear the consequences
of such international demands in the political, legal and economic spheres. Otherwise,
the international community will outcast the non-complying states with all the
consequences that follow.69
In the case of international economic law, international organizations, such as the
World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO have great influence over the international
financial order. This is due to the fact that the World Bank and the IMF possess,
through their lending power, economic and political leverage over recipient states. On
the other side, the WTO regulates the order through which international trade shall
operate. For example, the WTO demands regulatory changes before even being a
member of the organization.70 Whereas developing states, especially after being
liberalized, will have to abide by WTO rules in order to secure their economic
demands.71 Accordingly, as for IFIs, internalization of the international economic
order’s requirements takes place through the conditions of these institutions in return
for their financial support; the so-called “conditionality”. While for the World Trade
Organization (WTO), its inputs with regard to the domestic economic laws of the
67
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member states are represented in its entry requirements. Moreover, such laws that
govern international trade and investment have a great impact on the national
economies and income distributions within states. For instance, the “race to the
bottom phenomenon”, which is a result of decreasing social protection and wages in
order to attract foreign investment.72 This is why, in addition to the normal sources of
international commitments, the conditions that these institutions impose for releasing
their funds, or the regulation of trade, constitute an additional source of commitment,
especially for the developing states that extensively depend upon these institutions in
order to adjust their macro/microeconomic demands.73
The forces of globalization act implicitly and explicitly through a reciprocal process
of internationalizing and internalizing legal norms. On the international stage,
international law obliges states to respect and enforce its norms over other internal
ones. As long as the state accepts to be bound by international obligation,74 it will
have to respect its requirements through the embedment into its policies on the one
hand, and the removal of any obstacles for implementation on the other. The powers
of globalization, especially with regard to international economic requirements,
internationalize certain aspects of state governance in order to be in line and coherent
with other international market policies. Matters such as taxation, privatization,
corporate governance, liberalization, and deregulation of the market system are
considered to be of international concern; since they are vital for the free flow of
capital.75 Through such processes, the global market will consider whether to grant a
given state access to participate in ongoing economic activities, or to recognize it as
an undesirable party. It is essential to indicate here that the World Bank, in its recent
lending operations, was depending on the mutual transfer of such legal knowledge.76
Furthermore, the role performed by multinational and transnational corporations that
operates within states, especially those in the legal field, stretches the transfer of legal
knowledge and traditions across a state’s borders.77 Such mechanisms internalize the
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rules of the international actors within the national governance system of the states,
sometimes willingly and at other times coercively.78 Correspondingly, international
law has not only globalized the rules upon which international relations are built. It
also developed mechanisms that allowed the internalization of its rules within the
domestic law of the nation state.79 Despite the separation between what is political and
what is economic at the international level, the mutual interaction between the
international principles in general, and the domestic policies of the states that
eventually establish the legal nature of its governing order, indicate otherwise. Thus,
the utilization of the rule of law for the achievement of either political interests or
economic leverage is being enhanced by different international legal mechanisms and
global forces.
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III. Economic Development and Governance through the Rule of
Law
This chapter covers the evolution in the relationship between law and economic
development. In this regard, and as Trubek has indicated, economic development is
the interaction between law, economics, and their institutional practices.80
Accordingly, this chapter begins by identifying the essence of the reliance on legal
norms as a foundational base for development, as it is claimed to be. It also highlights
its essentiality to the IFIs when imposing their structural changes on developing states.
Then, it demonstrates the relationship between the two disciplines during different
historical phases and their institutional practices, starting in the 1950s till the 2000s.
Such changes in the rule of law with regard to development entailed a change in the
role of the state and the way it exercises its sovereign powers over its economic and
social policies, which is covered within the third section of this chapter. The last
section delineates the outcome of such interactions with regard to the main objectives
of the neoliberal project, namely trade liberalization and an increase in foreign
investment flows and protections.
A. Why the Rule of Law is Necessary for Economic Development Generally,
and to the Neoliberal Paradigm in Particular?
In this regard, it is essential to make a distinction between classic liberalism and
neoliberalism on the one hand, and the different types of neoliberalism on the other.
Some might link liberalism to the political and economic methodology of
neoliberalism, as they might appear similar. Nevertheless, there are some major
differences between the two approaches. Whereas liberal philosophy was based on
individual freedoms and the separation between what is public and private,
neoliberalism focuses on the rules that control and govern entire economic, social, and
political spheres in their entirety.81 For liberalism, the role of the state is very minimal,
often described as the “night-watchman state”.82 Its role is limited to maintaining
public order and the protection of the society domestically through law enforcement,
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security, defense, and providing non-excludable goods.83 From the economic point of
view, liberalism believes in laissez-faire as a governing principle for private market
relations and the government.84 This is when economic transactions within the market
are free from the state’s interventions in order to ensure the individual freedoms of the
parties, and the role of the state is limited to monitoring the market.85
Contrary to liberalism, neoliberalism depends on a strong interventionist state model
for the implementation of its methodology.86 Both German ordo-liberalism and US
neoliberalism were based on market-oriented ideologies.87As for ordo-liberalism, its
ideology is based on economic liberty, which grants to the state the authority required
to achieve such an objective.88 On the other side, neoliberalism is more inclusive. In
that regard, the market is what governs the actions of the state. In other words, the
different state’s policies are being based, oriented, and governed by the market.89 The
economy, in that regard, is not a separate domain from other social and political
activities. On the contrary, it is the governing rationality for different human practices
within the different social spheres of the state.90 Furthermore, and due to such marketoriented governance, individuals under neoliberalism are also subjected to being
uniquely controlled, due to assuming responsibility for social risks, such as illness,
unemployment, or poverty as the responsibility of the individual himself and not the
state.91 Such an approach of “self-care” or the “technology of the self” shifts
economic and social burdens from the government to the individual under the
umbrella of proper regulations.92 For both ideologies, the rule of law is the paramount
element that is being instrumentalized, and through which economic objectives are to
be achieved.93 The unique characteristics of the legal rule qualify it to be the ideal
instrument for the implementation of such ideologies.
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The legal rule possesses distinct features that do not exist in other types of norms. As
Kelsen indicated, “law commands obedience not because of its goodness, or its
justice, or its rationality, but because of the power behind it.”94 The legal rule is the
construct of the social structure through which citizens within a given state are
governed. It has a coercive power behind its application which is attributed to the
state; as the entity entitled to serve out punishment whenever a violation is committed.
One of the legal features of the law is predictability.95 This is an essential feature for
the legal rule since it requires, and presumes, prior knowledge of the rule in order for
punishment to be legitimately served upon violation. Nationally, the state, represented
by the legislative authority, is the one entitled to enact laws. Moreover, punishment
shall be executed through the authority mandated to do so. However, a legal decision
should be rendered, deciding the existence of guilt, in order for the punishment to be
legitimized. In this regard, Cohen argues that legal rulings are not the logical outcome
of the already-existing rules.96 He also emphasizes that the implementation of the
legal rule could be subject to many influences, such as social, political or economic
ones.
The normative power that the legal rule possesses makes it tempting for any entity to
induce a change in a given community. It is the perfect tool to be instrumentalized to
foster such change. As Hale emphasizes that law is powerful in regulating distributive
and barging powers within the society, it is best described as:
an element of the context, constitutive of bargaining power, and
influential on the outcome, not as a single bloc it directs, but rather as
an almost definitely long list of particular legal rules, each of which
has a part in the strategic calculations of the parties.97
Accordingly, law as a coercive tool regulates market fluctuations within a given state
according to its economic governance policy. In this regard, there are two scenarios
for the market system to operate. Either power is handed to the state as a sovereign
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power over its citizens, and the struggle starts in order to prevent the abuse of power;
or, delivering such power to, and allow its exploitation by, the ruling class.98
This is why it is not a surprise that the IFIs have such an interest in the rule of law;
since it is so essential for the purpose of the transformation of national economic
governance systems into a neoliberal form. It provides protection for foreign
investment, stability for trade regulations, and, in case of neoliberalism, restricts
unwelcomed interruptions to market operations. Additionally, it provides institutional
protections to such practices through the practices of legal institutions. Moreover,
sufficient knowledge is required in order to exercise coercive power efficiently.99
Such knowledge is represented by the embedded politicians and legal specialists who
believe that there is only one way for the markets to operate, which is the one dictated
by the IFI and the international order.
Nevertheless, the coercive nature of the law allows its exploitation, either through the
way it is enacted, or the way it is implemented. If either of the two phases were
subject to an influence, the coercive nature of the law will serve such interests. Such
interests might not be stipulated within the articles of law. However, its application
will serve such interests without any explicit indication. In describing such a case,
Kennedy emphasizes in his 1991 paper, The Stakes of Law, the deductions of
Foucault in that regard, as he expresses that, “negotiations in the shadow of the law is
just not part of its project”. What is more, and with regard to the other element of the
rule of law, as Cohen illustrates, the law is what judges decide, and not what the rules
indicate, as an emphasis on its functionality.100 This indicates how the circumstances
of creating the legal norm and its driving forces could be mystified. That is how
abusive using the rule of law could be, which explains the frustrations of the
developing world in using such methodology in exchange for financial assistance to
attain economic growth and development. Consequently, the exploitation of such
normative power, especially when it comes from entities alien to the developing state,
under the coercive need for financial support, is to be considered a violation of its
sovereign integrity and a challenge for its authority.
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B. The Different Integrations of the Rule of Law in Economic Development
This section will explain the different interactions between law and development,
starting from the postwar period. Law had different integrations during the different
stages of economic development. The essentiality of the rule of law to the
development project was present from the beginning. Starting from the postwar
period, the strict formalism of the law was used in order to enforce state economic
agendas, such as the ISI. The use of law for the purposes of development was obvious
in the domain of public law, as economic operations were regulated by the state.
However, within the liberal market model from the beginning, law was regarded as an
important element for development. Accordingly, the coherence between the rule of
law and the liberal market model was fundamental for restricting governmental
interferences within market operations. Nevertheless, such interference became
essential in the neoliberal model; not to interrupt the market with restrictions, but to
safeguard its operations through private law and to allow markets to govern.
1. Instrumentalizing Law by the State during the Postwar Period (1950s-1960s)
After the end of World War II, the developing states realized that they were strongly
dependent on the developed with regard to manufactured goods. They were mainly
exporting raw materials and natural resources to the developed states since they did
not possess the technology to converting such resources into the end products they
needed. Most of the developing countries during this period realized that their
dependency on the developed states must come to an end because of the disturbance
to the flow of goods during the two World Wars. Moreover, and after the rise of
decolonization movements and nationalism, developing states rejected the idea of
being economically dependent on the developed ones. As a consequence, developing
states started to adopt the industrial development approach for the purpose of
manufacturing needed commodities domestically, without the need for foreign
assistance, in an attempt to become similar to the developed world.101
The interaction between law and development was limited during the period of the
1950s and 1960s.102 The emergence of such interdisciplinary study was based on the
Western paradigm, which considered important the role of the state for achieving
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market progress.103 The rationale behind law and development studies was to replace
the legal education formalism that might hinder free market development through
transplanting modern rules and institutional frameworks that enhance such
objectives.104 Law was being instrumentalized by the state in order to impose order.
The objective of its use was to eliminate any obstacles that hinder economic
progression.105 On the national level, the enactment of the legal rule was usually for
national purposes that the governing authority within a given state deemed essential.
In order to support such a national strategy, a given state, which is represented by its
legislative authority, will issue laws that guarantee the implementation of these
strategies. Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was the economic development
model that was followed by many developing states during this historical phase.
Accordingly, for the fulfillment of this national vision, issuing laws that limit
importing unnecessary commodities, increase tariffs on other products, or direct
national spending for certain projects will be the logical authoritative choices. In order
to support national industries, the state in this mode of development resorted to
imposing tariffs, manipulating change rates, imposing currency controls, issuing
import licensing, and subsidizing credit.106 Nevertheless, ISI as an economic model
was criticized for being inefficient with regard to export performance and agriculture,
resource allocation, and for increasing rates of unemployment as a result of shrinking
the role of the private sector. 107
Law in this regard was meant to maintain a certain economic order that is imposed by
the state among the different actors within its jurisdiction. In addition, law was the
regulatory framework that governed commercial transactions within the state’s
domestic market. Regardless of the level of interference of law within a marketoriented or planed market economy, its formal presence was completely attributed to
the state’s governance system. For instance, and with regard to capitalism in Europe,
the objective of legal formalism was for the mere distinguishing between the public
and private spheres. Moreover, the function of legal norms was limited to the
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identification of the essential elements required for the primitive markets to operate,
such as right, fault, and will. This resembles to a certain extent the old classical legal
thought as described by Kennedy.108
That is why economic governance and market operations were regulated in
accordance with public law. Unlike the subsequent period, as will be seen in the next
section, market governance shifted form the area of public law to private law as an
effect of liberalization. In addition, social norms were not fully incorporated into the
field of law and development studies. This is why the economic policies of the
developing states were a reflection of their national political integrity and sovereign
independence after the end of the war and decolonization. This indicates that the
ideology behind the establishment of legal norms, in that sense, whether it was for
criminalizing an act or regulating market behavior, is the same: to support national
governance.
At the international level, law was not in the scope of interest of the IFIs after their
establishment in the 1950s. The main focus then was the developmental purposes that
these institutions were established for. The World Bank and the IMF were not
interested in the employment of the legal rule for the benefit of developmental
objectives, especially given that they were supporters of the ISI policy. In addition,
there were already bargaining agreements between the developed states and the
developing ones; where the latter would provide raw materials and natural resources
in return for manufactured products from the former.109 As a consequence, the mutual
interaction between law and development, whether at the domestic or the international
level, was very limited. Nevertheless, the interruption of that system started with the
oil crisis in the beginning of the 1970s. Accordingly, law was used as means of
governance, regardless of the objective of the legal norm.
2. Law as an Element of Development: The Rise of the Rule of Law as a
Common Objective for Neoliberal Development and Social Movements (1970s1980s)
At the end of the 1960s, and in the beginning of the 1970s, major economic shifts
started to emerge as a result of the increasing number of states that managed to
108
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become decolonized, the competition between the Western and Eastern Blocs for
market dominance, and the increased role performed by other international economic
actors, such as the World Bank and the IMF. In addition, and after determining the
preceding period’s economic and social downfalls, the new development paradigm
recognized the mutual interest in the rule of law for achieving economic growth and
maintaining social rights. The preceding period, which was dominated by classical
legal thought,110 was criticized for individualistic formalism that was based on the
“will theory”.111 It ignored the main social rights of several groups, such as labor
rights, which gave rise to pluralism and institutionalism. The advocates for these
social rights demanded recognition of the new social norms through the rule of law,
with regard to both regulation and implementation.112
Both the proponents of social rights and free market liberalism recognized the
importance of incorporating the legal rule as an element of their schemas. But this
time, integration of law was different from that of the 1960s, since law was not only
regarded as an instrument for policy implementation. The new purpose of utilizing
law was aimed more toward attaining an institutional juristic change within the state.
The change will perform a dual role in this concern. Initially, it will ensure the free
mode of market operation, thereby fulfilling neoliberal objectives. Secondly,
restraining the state from interfering within the market, and the fulfillment of social
demands and democratization through the same regulatory and institutional
changes.113 The new development paradigm aimed to replace the old formalism with a
new one, not only at the regulatory level, but also at the institutional one, which is
represented by the judicial authority. In this regard, the legal protection that is
provided through court practices was essential for guaranteeing both social rights and
free market operation. Such protection was required against state interventions that
might undermine these objectives. Consequently, change would tackle both the lawmaking process and its implementation.
With regard to the developing states, the pressure was extremely high due to the
increase in market forces, and the demands required by the international financial
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institutions in return for financial assistance. Meanwhile, after the rejection of the
NIEO proposal, the developing states gave up and were incorporated into the
neoliberal market. Such incorporation required additional financial resources that
these states did not possess; thus, the only resort they had with regard to financial
assistance was the BWIs in order to overcome the economic gap. The liberalization
model demanded a market free of state intervention through the deregulation of its
rules, and by transferring public enterprises to private ownership. Such change was in
the agenda of the Bretton Woods Institutions and was introduced as the Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP). The program introduced the new market approaches that
were formulated by the neoliberals in the West during this period, which encouraged
the developing states to adopt export-led growth, maintain a free market, privatize
state-owned enterprises, and the increase in foreign investment as essential
requirements for economic growth. This completely free and unrestrained marketoriented approach eliminated and restricted state interference within market
operations. It shifted the state’s economic policy and governance from the domain of
public law to private, under the supervision and protection of judicial review. In short,
it regulated the deregulation of the market.
However, as Trubek emphasizes: “markets do not create conditions for their own
success.”114 Several market shocks, severe inequalities, and the increase in poverty
were the outcomes of this development paradigm. Accordingly, the second phase of
integrating the rule of law was criticized because of the contradictions between the
democratic/social project and neoliberal market project. The contradictions between
the two projects were because of the different foundational principles of the two
approaches. Whereas the neoliberal market proponents advocated for a deregulated
free market, they would not accept democratic social restraints on the market for
social purposes.115 Moreover, the issue of distribution was overlooked, maybe
intentionally, by the neoliberal market approach, while it was essential for the
socially-inclined, even if it required state intervention within the market. Furthermore,
the sole focus of the free market advocates for the integration of the rule of law for the
purpose of making national economies more desirable for foreign investments; while
disregarding the imbalance that could occur between different sectors of the
114
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population.116 Lastly, and with regard to the IFIs’ economic behavior, this
development paradigm was criticized for its systematic intervention within the state’s
sovereignty through attaching regulatory conditions to the loans, interfering in the
developing state’s domestic policies, and their exercise of sovereign powers.117
It was obvious that the primary objective of the neoliberal approach was unleashing
the powers of the market through freeing up trade and enhancing foreign investment.
Social considerations were a secondary objective in its agendas. Whenever there is a
contradiction between the two interests, the market is the one that ought to prevail.
Such outcomes entailed another transformation in the relationship between law and
development. However, this time the rule of law is not a prerequisite for development,
but it is an end in itself for the next development paradigm.
3. The Rule of Law as an Objective for Neoliberal Economic Development
(1980s-2000s)
After reviewing the integration of law and development within the 1950s-1960s, and
its utilization for economic objectives, then the emergence of a unique form of the rule
of law during the 1970s-1980s that was distinguished from the former, and after
reviewing the critique that encountered its application, a new realization was reached
by the neoliberal economic scholars that restricting the role of the state was not
desirable for market operations.118 On the one hand, they recognized the necessity for
state intervention in order to compensate market failures, such as for social protection.
On the other hand, state intervention should be directed more towards market
protection through more empowerment of private law over public.119
The neoliberal advocates realized that the scope of economic development should be
more inclusive and not only rely on the market for attaining development. However,
the social objectives that were invoked during the preceding period ought to be
incorporated not only as an economic development objective, but also as means of
achieving developmental objectives.120 Human rights and advocates thereof from the
developing countries did not possess the power to create a development paradigm that
116

Id.
Supra note 17, at 213.
118
Supra note 34, at 7-8.
119
David Kennedy, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: TOWARDS A NEW ALLIANCE 54, (2013).
120
Trubek, supra note 34, at 8.
117

31

was based on their social demands in their confrontation with the developed states and
neoliberal powers.121Accordingly, human rights became utilized for economic
development in this phase, since they will improve the political climate within the
state that will eventually favor the encouragement of foreign investment, fostering
economic growth.122 Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning here that what is considered
to be social or human right has a broader interpretation within the scope of
development. The World Bank, for example, utilizes the word “rights” to indicate
basic requirements, such as education and health care.123 This wider interpretation for
individual rights makes it different from the scope of rights illustrated by the
international human rights institutions.124
On the other side, the integration of law in this new paradigm also changed. The rule
of law is not an element of economic development anymore, unlike the preceding
section. It became “an end in itself.”125 Instrumentalization of the rule of law was also
one of the distinctive features of this development model. Unlike the utilization of law
in the ISI model during the 1950s-60s, the instrumentalization of the law here had its
own characteristics. At the domestic level, the rule of law here is meant to restrict
bureaucratic discretion, implement liberal policies, empower and enforce contractual
and property rights obligations that arise from the market, constraining public norms
through private ones, and the formalization of informal rights.126 In addition to the
above, and as for the institutional function of the rule of law, this instrumentalization
incorporated the elimination of judicial discretion in the interpretation of the statutes,
and the encouragement of judicial review over other sectors, as will be displayed in
the case of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt within the next chapter.
At the international level, such instrumentalization had different manifestations. It
entailed a stricter regulation of free trade, harmonized international private law that
eliminates the social vulnerabilities of different judicial applications, and the creation
of parallel dispute settlement mechanisms that protect private foreign interests in case
national courts are untrustworthy, mainly with regard to developing countries.
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Moreover, the rule of law in this sense also integrated the national legal systems
through the maintenance of its simplicity and harmonization with the rest of the
international order. It also required the standardization and formalization of
international payments systems and banking regulations.127
The neoliberal development paradigm in this regard required wider and deeper
interference within state governance. The old objectives of liberalizing markets,
ensuring the free flow of capital, and the increase of foreign investments were the
same in the new development paradigm, but were more structurally supported from
the formalist point of view. This developmental paradigm had the blessing of the
developed states and the BWIs.128 Meanwhile, the competition between the Western
and Eastern Blocs on seducing the emerging economies was still ongoing. However,
the collapse of the Soviet Union marked an end to this competition. Furthermore, the
pronouncement of the Washington Consensus as a neoliberal economic cure for the
underdeveloped economies emphasized, on the one hand, the neoliberal economic
victory, and on the other the absence of alternatives for developing states.
Nevertheless, and due to subsequently severe economic crisis, the neoliberal
consensus was subjected to a tough questioning, especially with the rise of the Asian
economies which disregarded neoliberal policies through the adoption of state-led
export-oriented approaches.129 Such consensus, as previously indicated in Chapter
Two, became the new IFI conditionalities in return for their financial assistance.
In an attempt to handle such criticism, the World Bank conveyed its new development
approach through the adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework
(CDF). It was introduced as another more holistic economic policy that aims at
achieving economic growth along with the preservation of certain social structures
through good governance and the rule of law.130 The World Bank in that regard
continued shifting from project-based to policy-based lending by attaching conditions
that are associated with releasing of funds, as in the SAP.131 The CDF preserved the
structural adjustments that were required within the older policies, yet had its unique
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implementation mechanisms.132 Unlike the previous policies, it was recognized as
having a “polycentric normative order”.133 It involved the imposition of restrictions on
the state’s authority, more reliance on the judiciary and its institutions, the
involvement of other informal actors with regard to governance (such as NGOs and
civil society organizations), the use of soft laws, the acknowledgment of non-legal
normative sources that emanate from civil society and other market actors, and the
inclusion of human rights as a developmental end in itself.134 It rendered the economic
paradigm more toward emancipation rather than development. Nevertheless, this
developmental policy was criticized for “market centered agendas for social
justice”,135 as it altered the conceptions of social objective, such as gender equality
and labor rights, in order to suit market objectives and to maintain economic growth.
This is not to mention the instrumentalization and categorization of social objectives
depending on whether or not they induce and fulfill the market objectives of the
CDF.136 Such interreferences within the recipient state’s sovereignty invoked concerns
regarding the limitations of the scope of operations of the IFIs and their mandates, as
indicated earlier in the previous chapter.137
It would seem that neoliberal development presents itself as a panacea. As if all the
justice, morality, and equalities are integrated within its programs. It implemented and
enhanced the rule of law, alleviated poverty, fostered economic prosperity and
growth, eliminated inequalities, and no doubt improved distribution. Each
development paradigm holds the same promises; nevertheless, the developing states
were never “civilized” enough to implement any of these policies correctly. For
neoliberal development, the right answer to any economic or social problem always
lies in the free market-oriented order. It demands changes through the power of law,
to be implemented by the rule of law, and to be protected by the legal institutions
which apply the law. The heavy reliance on the rule of law as a foundational objective
within the consecutive development paradigms makes it as if it will end all economic
and social miseries. However, after each failure, a new development paradigm appears
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which claims more inclusivity than its predecessor; furthering the demands and
determining deferent assignments for the developing states to perform.
C. The Different Integrations of the Role of the State in Relation to
Neoliberal Economic Development
Starting in the 1980s, the IFIs’ economic policies were pro-market fundamentalism
that enhanced market-oriented structural adjustment that transform the economic role
of the state to be more supportive and favorable for investing in the private sector.138
Prior to this moment, economic independence was the dominant motive behind the
actions of the post-colonial states. Developing states were eager then to end Western
economic dominance through self-reliance on national resources and industries.
Nevertheless, and after the industrial sparks faded away due to multiple political and
economic factors, the neoliberal market approach dominated the picture of the global
economy, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.139 In each neoliberal
policy starting from the end of the 1970s to the beginnings of the 1980s, there has
been a different role for the state to perform.
It was obvious from the beginning how liberal proponents did not welcome state
intervention within market operations. Accordingly, they advocated for freeing the
market from states interference.140 However, neoliberal proponents dominated and
illustrated how the role of the state is essential for the protection of market
liberalization and the attraction of foreign investments. The adoption of the rule of law
by the neoliberal movements was fundamental for the implementation of their
policies. Nevertheless, with every economic downfall, a new neoliberal policy
emerges justifying a new style of developmental intervention in order to modify the
equation of economic growth and prosperity. Accordingly, the issue of state
sovereignty was highly contested because of the consecutive interferences in the
domestic affairs of developing states.
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It is clear with regard to neoliberal methodology the separation between the political
and economic sovereignty of the state. It is also well recognized in the realm of
international law that states have the right to exercise their sovereign powers within
their territory.141 They possess sovereign immunity against international interventions
within their domestic affairs. However, it seems that economic interventions, either
from one state within another, or from an international institution within a state, do
not fall under this category of foreign interventions. This could be due either to the
fact that they are recognized as legitimate, or this is not recognized as an intervention
at all. In that regard, I believe both are correct. However, the image gets more
complicated when it is compared with human rights interventions. It depends on
where one stands. In case of domestic policies and interests for economic
development, the market and economic growth are considered more important than
social interests, which permits interferences even if it were at the expense of social or
human rights concerns. Nonetheless, it is different from the international point of
view, where human rights violations require immediate intervention, even if it entails
in some cases destroying a whole economy, whether by military intervention or
economic sanctions. The bipolarity of the doctrine of interventions in that regard is
very clear.
In addition, and in relation to the IFIs, it seems that the political limitations within
their mandates do not solve the case in hand, since recent policies aimed at limiting
and binding the state through restricting the introduction of changes to market
regulatory rules, and further, through outsourcing some of the state’s function to other
independent agencies, such as central banks. The new IFIs’ policy aims at
constitutionalizing these internationally required economic reforms and blocking the
way for any other domestic interference, even from democratically elected
delegates.142143 The South African case manifests just such a deduction. Before the
national party handed power to the African National Congress (ANC) after attempts to
end the apartheid regime, and in order to reserve some of its powers, the party reached
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a deal with the ANC to employ the Washington Consensus as an economic reform
strategy. It engaged with such reforms through adhering to structural adjustment
programs set by the IMF and the World Bank. They signed the GATT agreement and
adopted the neoliberal market approach. As a consequence, for such economic
engagements, the ANC lost its discretion in appointing another governor for the
central bank other than the one in office during apartheid because of its
constitutionally-guaranteed independence. They could not conduct any economic
maneuvers or introduce any changes because of the constitutional, organizational, and
conventional obligations that they were committed to. The ANC found themselves
locked-in economically and had only virtual control over the state without any
economic powers for redistribution.144
The adoption of the rule of law and good governance techniques caused the erosion of
the sovereign rights of states, and redefined their role with regard to commitments
toward their citizens.145 As the IFIs’ requirements created a state of contradiction
between what should and should not be done, such as whether social rights took
precedence over market liberalization or the opposite when there are contradictory
interests. Whereas developing nations struggled to restore part of their social and
economic integrity, lost due to colonization, the subsequent economic development
strategies stripped them of their future hopes for better social conditions. That is due
to the limitations that these policies imposed over public spending for social interests
and any subsidies for elevating economic pressures over the deprived.146 The dilemma
in this concern is that the IFIs legitimized the interference in state governance, based
on the wide and vague interpretation of their mandates with regard to the scope of
development and political restrictions. Since the borders in that regard were and still
are not well-defined, this increased the chance of a collision with the political
prohibition barrier.147
There are two kinds of pressures that developing countries endure. The first is because
of the international financial requirements and rules, as previously indicated. The
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second is the aspirations for development and the improvement of their economic
conditions. In addition to the huge pressure that is exercised upon developing states
because of globalization and international demands, these states were additionally
blamed for governance deficiencies. The idea was integrated since the inception of
postwar development programs. Developing nations were regarded as underdeveloped
and barbaric communities who were so because they were not part of the West.148
Such pre-integrated presumptions of the developing states made the excuses for the
different development policies not functioning seem plausible. As a consequence, why
would the BWIs, for instance, take the blame for the non-functioning economic
governance policies that they adopted so long as the blame was already placed on
these developing communities. This goes without considering that the developing
states were disadvantaged in comparison to the developed ones; since the latter stand
on higher ground when it comes to negotiating economic terms within the global
institutional order.149
What is more is that there is a lack of evidence with regard to the essentiality of the
rule of law for achieving economic development and attracting foreign investment.150
In one of his lectures, Erik Jensen questioned the causality between the rule of law on
the one hand, and economic growth and development on the other, indicating that a
state like India does not have proper application of the rule of law, yet they are
economically advanced and have high growth rates.151 Furthermore, this economic
order, in addition to the prior constraints, imposes sanctions over states for the
protection of foreign investments through other legal methods that are not subject to
state control, such as arbitration. This also burdens the states in two different ways.
Initially, it creates a state of “regulatory chill”, which will be discussed later.152
Secondly, it makes the state liable for certain circumstances that are beyond its
control. As a consequence, instead of being a method for improving the conditions of
the developing states, economic development became a system of governance and
control over their national economies and state administration.153 In that regard,
neoliberal economic development would govern domestic markets through the
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implantation of self-operating private laws that guarantee the liberalization of market
operations and investment protection through the rule of law. This would be realized
either through the structural adjustments that the BWIs undertake, which is the
prevailing scenario, or through other market forces such as international trade rules
and other international investment and trade agreements. Such interaction between
governance through the rule of law on the national and international levels shall be
demonstrated in the next section with regard to international trade and investment.
D. Defusing the Legal Matrix of International Economic Law: The
Application of the Rule of Law in the Case of International Trade and
Investment
One of the main objectives of the neoliberal market approach is to encourage foreign
investment and the free flow of capital across the globe. This claim was based on the
great benefits that investment might bring to states, especially the developing ones. As
it increases the flow of foreign currency within the state’s economy, increases job
opportunities, and even, but not always, facilitates the transfer of know-how from the
developed economies to the least developed. For neoliberal proponents, investment
was essential for the developing states to promote economic growth and to achieve the
desired economic development. In this concern, and as an indication for its
importance for the international economic system, and in order to exercise and impose
more economic governance over the international market, the World Bank established
in 1966 the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID).154 The ICSID is considered one of the subdivisions of the World Bank.155
The mission of the ICSID is to settle international disputes through the mechanism of
arbitration. In this regard, the relatively newly established organ strengthened the grip
of Western dominance over the developing states’ national economies through
possessing its own dispute settlement mechanism.
Although there are other options for foreign investors to settle their investment
disputes with states through arbitration, such as resorting to the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC), the ICSID is the most favorable destination for two main
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reasons. Firstly, ICSID is subject to the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, as it is established through an international convention. Secondly, it has a
unique binding power over states since signatory members consent to recognize an
award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and to be enforced within the
state’s territory as if it were their national courts’ final judgment.156 Other
international dispute settlement mechanisms do not possess such binding power. As a
consequence, foreign investors usually prefer inserting ICSID into their agreements
with states as a resort for dispute settlement, avoiding submission to the adjudication
of the state’s national courts, especially within developing countries.
In that regard, as the developing world considers developing states as immature
economically, foreign investors also consider the same with regard to application of
the rule of law. Accordingly, as long as there are no international agreements that
restrict resorting to ICSID as a dispute settlement mechanism, it will be the primary
choice. Many regional investment agreements were concluded in order to avoid such
an extreme and expensive choice. Most of these regional agreements were conducted
between developed states, or developed states and other states with high production
capabilities, as the CETA, NAFTA, and TTIP agreements.
As a response to neoliberal market demands, many states concluded bilateral
international agreements (BITs) in order to foster the development process, through
encouraging foreign investors within the state’s via the treaty. The number of bilateral
and multilateral agreements grew extensively starting in the 1960s, especially after
establishing the ICSID in parallel to the increase of neoliberal dominance over the
international economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 furthered the
interests of capitalism, and likewise foreign investments.157 Accordingly, many states,
especially the developing ones, concluded bilateral and multilateral treaties with
developed states in order to increase the flow of investment and foreign capital within
their economies. As indicate earlier, foreign investors usually favor including the
ICSID in their agreements. Accordingly, most of the concluded agreements had the
ICSID clause. The states, back then, underestimated the consequences of joining the
ICSID convention and agreed to its insertion within their investment agreements.
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However, dramatic consequences appeared shortly, mainly within the developing
states, as it was an excessively expensive mechanism for dispute settlement.
According to a study conducted within the European Union, to defend a case in front
of the ICSID will cost around USD 8 million, which is a considerably high cost for
developing states.158 Moreover, and with regard to the arbitral awards that grant
compensations to the foreign investor, there are almost no limits for the amount that
might be indicated within the award. For instance, Ecuador was obligated to pay USD
1.77 billion in compensation to a US petroleum company.159 The amount was
increased after counting interest and legal costs and reached USD 2.4 billion, which
amounted to the annual health expenditure for seven million people within Ecuador.160
This is not to mention the fact that the only party that has the power to bring a case
before the ICSID is the foreign investor.161
Such huge expenses for merely entering and losing an investment case before an
international investment arbitral tribunal had major consequences. It created a
phenomenon called “the regulatory chill”; which is when governments abstain from
enacting regulations or implementing them, even if they were in the interests of the
state, in order to avoid the drastic consequence of investor-state arbitration.162 In one
case, Newmont vs. Indonesia, the Indonesian government adopted a policy for
increasing export values and rates of employment, which proposed a restriction on
exporting unprocessed minerals. Before this policy entered into force, taxes were
increased on unprocessed minerals. As an objecting response, the US mining company
(Newmont) filed a case before the ICSID claiming damages for the acts of the
Indonesian government. In response, and in order to escape the severe consequences
of such arbitration, the Indonesian government had to lower taxes for Newmont to
withdraw the case. This example emphasizes how states are being stripped of their
sovereign powers within their own territory. This created a huge problem within the
developing states with regard to enacting new laws that might have an impact on
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ongoing business that involved a foreign party. It made the developing state
governments refrain from issuing laws that might be in the interest of the state and its
citizens, since any change subsequent to the investment agreement might become a
future investment dispute.163
In response to such threats, many states started either to withdraw from the ICSID
convention, terminate investment agreements, or amend the terms of those
agreements. For instance, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID
convention. South Africa banned its entrance in any new investment agreements, and
terminated agreements with Belgium and Luxemburg.164 Even powerful economies
started to avoid such dispute settlement mechanisms through establishing regional
alternatives, such as CETA or the proposal for establishing a European investment
court instead. Accordingly, if the developed states that enjoy the luxury of having an
alternative are trying to escape this internationally created system, what is the case for
developing states who have limited choices, if not but to submit to such global forces?
Otherwise, such states will not be favorable destinations for foreign investment, which
contradicts the neoliberal development strategies.
The discrepancy here has multiple dimensions. Primarily, the developing states are
disadvantaged with regard to international investment in comparison to the developed
ones. This due to the fact that the developed states have more advanced industries and
stronger economies which direct the flow of investment to the weaker and needier
economies on their terms, mainly in the developing world. Moreover, the developing
states will have to open their domestic markets if they require any financial assistance
from the IFIs because of conditionality. Although the developing states previously
consented to the terms of their lending agreements with the IFIs, behind such
agreements are coercive essential and basic economic demands. Furthermore, the
policy lending strategy that the IFIs have followed recently obliges developing state
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governments towards deregulating their market system, to privatize what is publicly
owned, and not to intervene within its operations.
By adding investment arbitration to the equation, the developing state will be deprived
of most, if not all, of its sovereign rights, even in the case of investment disputes. This
is not to mention the interference in internal policies of the state by capitalistic
corporations. It is worth mentioning in this regard that every international investment
treaty carries an infinite number of possible investor-state disputes. The net result of
such an equation is that the developing states are cornered with regard to their market
practices through the deprivation of their sovereign powers domestically, and the
imposition of a high level of protection on foreign capital transactions internationally.
Such an underprivileged situation expresses the extent to which developing state
economies are subject to distortions.
In addition to the abovementioned, and as for international trade, such international
treaties were not, as might be presumed, for trade purposes, but rather for
distribution.165 Modern international trade is the result of many wars that were
initiated during the eighteenth century for the sake of trade liberalization.166 However,
the coercive nature of the legal norms that construct the contractual obligations upon
which trade was built replaced the use of force in the next centuries.167 Such
formalism guaranteed unrestricted bargaining that does not consider social or moral
concerns with regard to any of the parties and made it acceptable to them.168 The
consecutive trade agreements continue to prioritize economic interests over social
rights.169 Accordingly, the current trade system, whether with regard to its ongoing
operations or the way it was regulated, does not consider social rights in the first
place, nor the developing states’ disadvantaged position in the system.
As a demonstration, the international governance system restricted the movement of
migrants between states. Initially, states were trading in products that were produced
by their own labor. There were no migration laws that restricted the mobility of labor.
Nevertheless, and after the fight against slavery, collective migration became
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prohibited. As a result, the new trade order with regard to power and capital mobility
became rigid with regard to the first and extremely flexible for the second.170 Capital
in the new trade order transfers to where the cheapest labor is located. The matter was
ensured by the neoliberal structural reforms undertaken by the IFIs, and enhanced by
the above-mentioned investment mechanisms. Current international economic
governance requires the existence of weak economies that are always in need of
economic assistance in order to be fertile soil for the economic demands of the
developed nations. Such economies will be constrained by their domestic private laws,
international economic legal requirements, and the desperate need for any foreign
capital to enter their economies in order to feed the hungry stomachs of their citizens.
All of these birds are being hit by one stone, namely the rule of law.
E. Other Choices: Exceptions to the Neoliberal Economic Development
Failures
As previously indicated, the current international economic order coerces developing
states into submitting to its demands through the rule of law. Nevertheless, it is also a
fact that some developing states managed not to follow the neoliberal economic model
and employed their national development plans, especially with regard to building
their economic capacities. The Asian Tigers are an exceptional example of such
economic progress, and an achievable one. The Asian example demonstrated that
developing countries, despite the economic pressures that they were subjected to, had
a way out. This also indicates that developing state governments possessed alternative
economic choices, that may be economically harder and more painful, other than
submission to neoliberal pressure. Resorting to the IFIs for financial assistance and
implementing their conditional structural reform is a hard choice, but it usually
appears easier and more suitable than undertaking major economic reforms, or
subjecting the political leadership to heavy economic and political criticism that might
endanger its stability and sustainability, as in Egypt’s case for instance.171 South
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are a role model for developing states who followed
different development roads other than the neoliberal development paradigm.
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There are many common features between these states and the other developing states
who did not manage to achieve such economic progress. Initially, these states were
colonies, as were most of the developing states. They were economically
underdeveloped and had to struggle against various economic challenges. These states
also began their economic development journey around the same period as most of the
developing states, during the 1960s-70s. Nevertheless, the major difference between
these states from the other developing ones is how their political leadership employed
the state’s interventionist powers. The common element between the three
aforementioned states is that they initially began, as many other developing nations
did, with the ISI as a development model. Yet, either during its adoption, or directly
after, they adopted state-led, export-oriented development policies motivated by the
limited natural resources they possessed.172 In all three examples, the state performed
a paramount role in the economic development policy and within market operations.
Furthermore, the political leadership managed to maintain equity levels within their
communities.173
1. South Korea and Taiwan
With regard to South Korea and Taiwan, the economic development of both nations
was greatly dependent on the state, in what is called the “statist approach.”174 In this
manner of development, economic development policies are based on the state’s
major plans for development, which the private sector also had to follow.175 The
state’s role also extended to the prevention of the formation of economic coalitions,
such as what happened in Indonesia,176 in order to not divide economic actors between
winners and losers.177 In the South Korean case, the state’s role was stronger than that
of Taiwan, as in the former it played a leading role, while in the second it was a
supporting one.178 Both states realized the downsides of ISI as a development policy,
so they adopted Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) in the early 1960s. Both
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states granted incentives to export-oriented industries and maintained a low foreign
exchange rate.179 With regard to South Korea, ISI policy remained in use selectively
in order to support export goods manufacturing by providing the necessary
materials.180 The economic focus was on light industries because of the lack of capital,
while the focus on heavy industries occurred gradually after the exports sufficiently
increased. 181 Both states gave great attention toward establishing high-quality human
capital through different means of human development, such as education. As a result,
such human capacity became a great asset that assisted these states in achieving
further development through manufacturing high-tech products.182
Unlike most of the developing nations, both states avoided becoming subject to
economic interventions, either by the IFIs or the developed states. Both states also
imposed some sort of control over their private and state-owned companies in order to
guide their economic development. As for South Korea, it did indeed rely on
international loans in order to finance parts of its development policy.183 However,
these loans were not attached to the type of economic policy they performed, nor
demanded its shift to another economic development policy. Nevertheless, it was not
until the 1990s, and for the sake of joining the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the developed states, that South Korea
had to liberalize its financial sector. Such economic transformation caused a change in
the interest rates, which private banks tried to take advantage of, contributing to the
financial crisis in 1997.184 While in Taiwan’s case, the state depended more on
domestic capital through its own stock market, alongside domestic savings.185
Moreover, the Taiwanese firms and banks avoided depending on foreign loans, which
made domestic capital the primary source of financing for Taiwan’s economic
growth.186 Yet in both cases, both states succeeded in realizing significant and steady
economic progress without increasing inequalities within their communities.
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According to the Gini index,187 South Korea maintained similar income inequality
rates, of 0.344 and 0.336, between 1965 and 1989 respectively.188 Taiwan also
managed to do the same, maintaining its income inequality levels during the same
interval, at between 0.322 and 0.292.189
2. Singapore
As for Singapore, it is a considerably new state in comparison to prior two states
above, since it gained its independence from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965.190 Its
economic development policy started right after independence. Singapore adopted a
mixed development approach that employed both the free market and state led
development.191 The country had limited resources but an excellent location that
needed to be utilized. Accordingly, trade liberalization was essential due to the forces
of the globalized market in order to restore its place as an economic hub.192 In
addition, the development plan also involved opening up to foreign capital as a
catalyst for economic growth, besides maintaining the stability of its fiscal and
monetary policies.193 Nevertheless, due to the limited domestic market, and similarly
to South Korea and Taiwan, Singapore also adopted an export-led industrialization
policy. It also invested greatly in education and infrastructure projects. Furthermore,
although the market was liberalized, the state also intervened in order to guide it
toward its industrial policy, which indicates that it was not entirely a free market.194
Singapore also relied on State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or Government Linked
Companies (GLCs), and avoided privatization as a neoliberal demand in order to be
able to steer its industrial policy.195 Moreover, and contrary to the requirements of the
Washington Consensus with regard to deregulation, Singapore maintained a heavily
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regulated labor market, a managed exchange rates for its currency, maintained land
ownership, and adopted unique social welfare policies.196
3. Indonesia
Indonesia almost passed through the same developmental phases as the three previous
examples. It began with a period of economic stabilization, rehabilitation, and partial
liberalization from 1966 till 1973.197 Then it moved to the second phase of rapid
economic growth because of the extreme increase in oil prices during the period of
1973-1982, after which it followed the ISI policy.198 Lastly, the state adopted an
export-oriented strategy during the period of 1983-1996. During this period, the
Indonesian government started the process of deregulation and liberalization.199
Nevertheless, Indonesia did not manage to maintain the same economic achievements
as the three prior examples, as it suffered from corruption, collusion, and nepotism.200
Deregulation, especially in the financial sector, made the Indonesian economy
vulnerable to the different internal and external economic fluctuations, which grew
into an economic crisis that overthrew Soeharto’s leadership after 30 years of rule.201
The four cases in hand demonstrate how these countries managed to achieve high
levels of economic progress, while simultaneously preventing inequalities and
promoting social welfare, especially for the first three. The four states did not
completely liberalize their markets, especially during the phases of structuring their
economies. They also employed different mechanisms in order to control their
markets and the paths of their development. They utilized the rule of law, but in favor
of their state-led, export-oriented industrial development. In addition, the four states
did not permit economic policy changes in return for financial assistance, especially in
the foundational development phases, and continued with their industrial export
policies. Finally, and after constructing sufficiently strong, productive economies that
were capable of enduring global competition, they opened up to the international
market. However, and despite the economic progress that these states managed to
achieve, subjection to global economic forces had its undesirable economic
196
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consequences, such as the financial crisis in 1997, and the shortcomings of the
Indonesian economy due to unregulated liberalization.
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IV. Egypt as a Case Study for the Implementation of the Rule of
Law while Transitioning to a Liberal Market-Oriented Economy
This chapter presents a practical legal study to the SAP program that was
implemented in Egypt starting in 1991. While many economists have studied the
program from the economic point of view, few have done it from the legal
perspective. In this regard, whereas most of the legal studies tend to focus on the
privatization process, this study focuses more on the investment part, in an attempt to
demonstrate how the implementation of the rule of law does not necessarily lead to an
increase in investment. The chapter begins with an introduction to the political
economy of Egypt, describing its transition from socialist economy to a neoliberal one
through the implementation of the SAP. Then it demonstrates the relationship between
the IFIs and Egypt, and the implementation of the SAP program. Section Three
reviews the regulatory transformations that took place during the period of transition
as an element of the rule of law that the BWIs adhere to. Section Four presents an
analysis of the impact of following these neoliberal policies on the successive
Egyptian investment laws as one of the main objectives of neoliberalism. Section Five
presents the other element of the application of the rule of law, which is the legal
institutional practice which is presented through the case of the Supreme
Constitutional Court judgments with regard to the neoliberal transformation. The last
section presents the outcomes of the implementation of the program after applying the
rule of law.
A. Historical Background of the Egyptian Political Economy
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak were the political leaders of Egypt during the period that
this paper covers. Nasser took charge in 1952 after the elimination of the monarchy.
Sadat took over from Nasser after his death in 1970. Sadat’s presidency lasted till he
was assassinated in 1981. Lastly, Mubarak became the political leader of Egypt for
thirty years till 2011 Revolution. The features of their respective regimes are as
follows:
1. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1952-1970)
Nasser managed to become the president of Egypt after the Free Officers’ coup in
1952. After overthrowing King Farouk, and after a short presidency by Mohamed
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Najib, Nasser started to shape his political leadership along a more centralized
approach. He was a political nationalist with socialist economic ideas.202 His acts
resembled those of many leaders of decolonized states during this period, who had a
historic sensitivity with regard to postcolonial powers, and were eager to achieve
economic independence alongside their newly-achieved political independence.203
Nasser had an industrial vision that he wanted to establish in order to end dependency
on the West for manufactured products. Accordingly, he undertook an industrial
policy that some regard as Import Substitution Industrialization,204 while others
believed that it was certainly an industrial policy, but not ISI.205 He adopted the
planned market economy approach, and relied heavily on the public sector for
economic activities.206 He aspired to convert the state economy from relying on
agriculture as a main source of income, to an industrial one, like the developed states.
He started to instrumentalize the law in order to achieve his purposes, such as the
issuance of the Land Reform Act of 1956.207 He regarded the High Dam as his
national project, to which he directed most of the country’s resources. After losing
confidence in Western support, Nasser established strong connections with the Soviet
Union and the Eastern Bloc, especially in the military sphere. After a shortage of
funding, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal in order to finance
the High Dam Project in 1956.208 The decision triggered the “Tripartite Aggression”
in response to the nationalization of the Canal. In addition, and because of his
unfriendly relationship with the West, Nasser did not depend on the IFIs for financial
support. He attempted to nationalize foreign and private businesses, mainly banks,
insurance companies, and financial institutions in 1961.209 Nasser managed to attain
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considerable development through his planned-market approach.210 Nevertheless, the
private sector’s activity deteriorated greatly during his rule due to his economic
policies. 211
2. Anwar el Sadat and The Open-Door Policy (1970-1981)
Sadat took charge of the state while at war in 1970. The economic conditions were so
rough that he described it as “below zero”.212 While he was in power, he started to
engage with the international economic community by signing the GATT agreement
and the ICSID agreements in 1970 and 1971. He wanted to improve the economic
conditions and saw in the West a stronger model than the Soviet Union. Subsequently,
after the war, he issued a new investment law in 1974 which was named the “Open
Door Policy Law,” or the law of “Infitah”. He was seeking to attract foreign investors
to invest in Egypt. Also, he wanted to open the door for Gulf oil money to be invested
in Egypt.213 Yet, till 1979, the amount of foreign investment was disappointing due to
many issues, such as the ongoing conflict with Israel and lack of trust in the
government after Nasser’s expropriations. During his rule, Sadat resumed diplomatic
relations with the United States and the IFIs.214 Many of his dealings then were with
the IMF, because of the imbalance of the Egyptian budget and the need for
macroeconomic assistance. One of the effects of such economic policies was the
Bread Riots of 1977, due to the cutting of subsides which increased prices.215 The
Egyptian economy during his rule was considered a rentier one. It mainly depended
on the revenues of the Suez Canal, tourism, and exporting crude oil.216 Nevertheless,
the liberalization of the market started during his rule.217
3. Hosni Mubarak and Economic Liberalization (1981-2011)
Mubarak started his rule in 1981 after the assassination of Sadat. During the Mubarak
era, the real transition from a state-planned to a market-oriented economy took place.
Mubarak’s administration relied on the IFIs for economic consultation and
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assistance.218 The state budget was ruined due to the hard economic conditions and
accumulated debts that the state inherited from the Sadat era.219 Due to severe
economic fluctuations, and in order to avoid political instability, the Egyptian
leadership’s choices were inclined towards engagement in a structural adjustment
program with the World Bank and the IMF, which was known as ERSAP. The
program aimed to introduce structural adjustments to budgetary and fiscal policy at
the macroeconomic level220, in addition to other structural adjustments to the market
at the microeconomic level. The program aimed to liberalize the market and dismantle
public sector enterprises through privatization.221 The project also targeted the
promotion of free trade and the attraction of foreign investment. The move to a
neoliberal economy was criticized by many scholars, especially for the way it was
implemented; since neither the private sector nor the market were ready for such
market changes. 222 Moreover, and after the program came to an end, other economic
shocks had drastic effects on the Egyptian economy, which caused the program to be
labelled an economic failure.223
B. Egypt, The IFIs, and the Stabilization Economic Program (ERSAP)
During Nasser’s period, Egypt had limited encounters with the IFIs. Egypt merely
contacted the World Bank in order to finance the High Dam project. The World Bank
was interested in offering such financial support in order that Egypt not resort to the
Soviet Union for aid back then.224 However, Nasser was adamant about his relations
with the Soviets. As a consequence, the World Bank called off the operation after
raising the money for the project, because of Egypt’s strong military relationship with
the Eastern Bloc.225 Relations with the IFIs were then severed till after October War.
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After the 1973 war, the political regime decided to direct its foreign policy towards
the West, as it is economically stronger than the Soviet Union.226 Egyptian policy
makers were anxious about the IFIs’ financial policies, as they considered them
unrealistic. The IFIs, from their side, were pushing the changes within the Egyptian
economy. Nevertheless, they were frustrated because the Egyptian government
accepted their analysis but did not proceed with their solution.227 The government, in
that regard, was against the IFIs’ suggested reforms, especially with regard to the pace
of implementation. They feared that the IFIs were insensitive towards the economic
situation in Egypt. One of the ministers even described the IFIs in that tone, saying:
“they are too eager to announce the crime and to pronounce the sentence.”228As a
consequence, the Egyptian officials kept stalling the required changes from the IFIs,
while the IFIs kept pushing for such changes in exchange for their financial aid. The
decision-making in that phase was influenced by the Egyptian officials, the bilateral
donors, and the multilateral agencies.229
However, the World Bank did not desire to create tensions with Egypt because of the
past encounter with regard to the High Dam. This was the reason why the IMF pushed
its economic advice more than the World Bank.230 As a consequence of the IMF’s
conditions with regard the macroeconomic reform, the Bread Riots took place in
1977.231 However, Egypt continued dealing with the IMF and the World Bank to
further the stability of the economy. Due to the debt crisis in 1987, and great budget
imbalances, Egypt had to sign an economic reform agreement which influenced
Egypt’s economic policy-making independence.232 Egypt signed an agreement with
the IMF in May 1991, and another one with the World Bank in November 1991.233
Both agreements aimed to stabilize the economy and enact structural reforms, which
was named ERSAP. The program was based on the Washington Consensus’ economic
principles.234 It is worth noting that Egypt was among the states with the highest
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number of attached conditions from the IMF in 1993, after Mauritania, with 56 in
total.235
It is debated among economists whether the program had succeeded or not in
achieving the desired objectives.236 Some consider that it was partially successful,
while others consider it a complete failure.237 Ikram indicated that the program
adopted by the IMF and the World Bank was inconsistent, as it depended upon
shrinking the public sector with a simultaneous enlargement of the private.238
Accordingly, it initially presumed that the private sector had enough resources to
replace the public sector. Secondly, it was not confirmed whether or not the private
sector was willing to take over the public one and would regard it profitable, which
did not happen in the end.239 The program was also criticized for greatly increasing
domestic debt, while reducing foreign debt. Another criticism was that the
liberalization of the market failed to secure the state’s needs. Furthermore, the
percentage of the deficit in 2003 surpassed that of 1989-1990, which was before the
implementation of the program.240
An explanation for such failure was the economic hit that the Egyptian economy
suffered due to the East Asian financial crisis.241 The second explanation was the
tourist attack on the 18th November in 1997 that took place in Luxor, as the incident
had a significant impact on tourism which was an essential source of foreign currency
to the country. The program overestimated the ability of the private sector to fill the
gap that the public sector left. Moreover, the program depended to a great extent on
the privatization of the public sector, and the World Bank did not consider that the
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market was not ready.242 Furthermore, the absence of market competition was an
essential factor that was overlooked, since what happened was the replacement of a
public monopoly with a private one.243 On the other side, the program was assessed as
a partial success since it managed to reduce the large external debts, which eliminated
pressure on the balance of payments and reduced the budget deficit.244
C. Transformation to a Neoliberal Market System and the Employment of
the Rule of Law
During the early 1970s, and despite the ongoing war with Israel, Egypt started to
make some economic moves at the international level. On the 9th May in 1970, Egypt
signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tarde (GATT), and later the WTO
agreement in 1995.245 In 1972, Egypt signed and joined the ICSID convention, which
entered into force on 2nd June 1972.246 After the war, president Sadat started to open
up to investment through law no. 43 of 1974,247 which was amended in 1977 for
further clarifications on the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound.248 He reestablished
diplomatic relations with the United States on 28th February 1974249 as a step towards
further economic and political support for the next phase. In 1979, the Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) was established for further legal institutional assurance.
The Court started to strike down old socialist legislation from the Nasser era, such as
the Land Reform Law.250
As indicated earlier, Egypt started to recommunicate with the IMF and the World
Bank in order to restore its economic balance. After Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak
took charge of the state and resumed the economic adjustments. In response to the
requirements of the economic reforms prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank, the
government started to enact pro-market legislation. The companies law no. 159 of
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1981 was enacted, substituting other laws in that regard.251 The privatization
movement started through the promulgation of the privatization law no. 203 of
1991.252 Also, the capital market law no. 59 of 1992 was promulgated in order to
regulate stock transactions within the market, which was essential for the privatization
process, as it took place through stock purchases. In addition, the new investment law
no. 8 of 1997 was issued in order to attract foreign investments. To follow, the Real
Estate Finance Law no. 148 of 2001 was promulgated for more real estate ownership
encouragement, and the Competition Law no.3 of 2005 was issued to regulate
competition and monopoly within the market.
Furthermore, in order to attract foreign capital inflows, and in response to the ongoing
market trends, Egypt started to conduct BITs with many states. The objective was to
add more assurances and facilitations in order to attract national investors of the state
parties to the treaties. Egypt signed 111 treaties and became one of the six highest
countries in the world in that regard.253 Many of these treaties were concluded
between the 1990s and 2000s, which indicates the essentiality of foreign investments
to the Egyptian economy, and the influence of liberal market policy over the decisionmaking process.254 It is also worth noting that Egypt signed the Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on 11th July 2007 with the
OECD. 255
D. The Legislative Evolution of Egyptian Investment Law as a Neoliberal
Requirement for Foreign Investment and the Rule of Law
Within the period studied for this paper, there were five consecutive investment laws
that were promulgated, starting from 1953 till 1997. Each of these laws had different
political and economic circumstances that shaped its characteristics. They represent a
cross-sectional view of the political and economic conditions during this period. They
also represent an indicator of the economic objectives of each transitional economic
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phase. In addition, they demonstrate the legal position of foreign investments during
this interval, and where the successive governments stand. These investment laws are
Law No. 156 of 1953, which was amended by Law No. 475 of 1954; Law No. 65 of
1971; Law No. 43 of 1974 which was amended by the Law No. 32 of 1977; Law No.
230 of 1989; and, Law No. 8 of 1997. The focus on reviewing these laws will be in
the light of certain parameters for relative indicators of economic liberalization as a
fulfillment of the neoliberal market economic objectives, such as: the free flow of
capital, tax holidays, protection against nationalization, property ownership, dispute
settlement mechanisms, and the number of investment agreements signed.256
1. Laws Before the Open-Door Policy
a) Law no. 156 of 1953 For Investment of Foreign Capital within the
Economic Development Projects and Its Amendments
This law was promulgated on 2nd April 1953 in the name of the guardian of the throne
after the military coup of 1952.257 It was named the Law of Investment of Foreign
Capital within the Economic Development Projects. The law was constituted of only
seven articles. The first article defined what was to be considered as foreign capital.258
The second indicated the beneficiaries of this law.259 The third was concerned with
foreign capital transfers to and from Egypt, and their limitations.260 The fourth article
indicated the acceptable limits of wage transfers outside Egypt for foreign experts and
labor.261The fifth article regulated the establishment of a specialized committee within
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for foreign capital investments and prescribed
its duties.262 Article 6 required the submission of an application in order to enjoy the
benefits of this law.263 Lastly, the seventh article commanded the competent minsters
to enforce the articles of this law and to issue the required decrees for its execution,
and to declare it as a functioning law the same day of its publishing in the official
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gazette. 264 The law was amended the following year by the Law No. 475 of 1954. The
subsequent law introduced two amendments to Article 1 and Article 3.265
During the proclamation of these two laws, the state was in a very delicate transition
after the removal of monarchy by military coup. The characteristics of the state’s
political and economic policies were not clear yet. As demonstrated, the two laws had
limited provisions in that their main functions were to define what was to be
considered foreign capital and how the state should deal with it. It seems like the law
was issued for the state to recognize how to handle foreign capital more than for the
investor to assess the environment of their future investment. Both the law and its
amendments did not stipulate any incentives, such as tax exemptions, or any
exceptional facilitations or incentives. It also did not specify any dispute settlement
mechanisms, conditions for investment, or guarantees against property confiscation.
It only identified what was considered foreign capital, established a special committee
with certain duties toward investments and the investor, and indicated periodical and
quantitative limitations on profit transfers outside the country.266 However, Article 2
was clear with regard to the purpose of the investment; stating that it should be for an
economic development project in fields of industry, agriculture, tourism,
transportation, mobilization, or mining. This expresses either a low level of
enthusiasm toward foreign investments or the insignificance of its presence during
that period. It also did not reveal the nature of the market system at that time.
Nevertheless, it was nearer to the liberal approach since there are limited limitations
on invested capital.267 It is worth noting that during this period there were already
several ongoing foreign investments within the Egyptian market.268
The above-mentioned law stayed in force during all of Nasser’s rule. He did not
attempt to introduce any changes to the law, with the exception of the promulgation of
the Law No. 51 of 1966, designating Port Said as a free zone.269 It is important to
indicate as well that Nasser issued Law No. 21 of 1958 for the Organization and
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Encouragement of Industry within the Egyptian Territory. The enactment of this law
was in line with his industrial tendencies and ambitions. The law regulated the
structure of Egyptian industry and the way it was to be governed.270 It also indicated
what was to be considered as Egyptian-made and specified the role of the state in this
important sector. The law, in its attached memorandum, explained how transforming
the state into an industrial one was essential for its independence and self-reliance. It
is also worth noting that this law did not tackle any aspects of foreign capital or
investments within the Egyptian industrial sector.271 However, the enactment of this
law reflects an adherence to the industrialization policies of most post-colonial states
during this era.
b) Law No. 65 of 1971 for the Investment of Arab Capital and Free Zones
This law was the first legislative attempt after Nasser’s era to open the Egyptian
market to foreign investments. This law terminated the effect of the prior investment
law and its amendments, previously indicated, and also entered into force the day it
was published in the official gazette. The law was constituted of 67 articles that
regulated the activity of foreign investments, and indicated the procedures the foreign
investor should adhere to in order to invest in Egypt.272 As is clear from the name of
the legislation, the law was meant to address Arab countries, mainly the Gulf, more so
than others. However, Article 18 expressed clearly that foreign capital would enjoy
the same privileges and guarantees as Arab capital, after cabinet consent and
presidential approval.273 Unlike the preceding law, this one was more detailed with
regard to the procedures, incentives, restrictions, and protection of foreign capital
investments within Egypt.274
Article 2 specified that the invested capital enjoys the guarantees that this law
stipulates, which prohibited its submission to state guardianship, nationalization, or
confiscation except for public utility in exchange for fair compensation in accordance
with the laws in force.275 The article also indicated that such compensation should be
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fulfilled within 6 months from the date of the procedure.276 The article also outlined
the procedures that should be followed if a dispute arose between the investor and the
authority, which was submission to domestic arbitration.277 Articles 7, 8, 9, and 10
indicated some restrictions and limitations on the transfer of wages, profits, or capital
outside Egypt.278 Moreover, Articles 19 to 52 outlined the facilities, exemptions,
dispute settlement, and procedures for establishing an investment in the determined
free zones; with exception to Article 37 that forbade any kind of dealing with Israel.279
Only Article 5 tackled the tax exemptions that the foreign investor might enjoy.280
Article 5 indicated a tax exemption for 5 years on the profits resulting from industrial
and commercial activities.281
During the promulgation of this law, Egypt was at war with Israel. Nevertheless, and
despite being the successor to a socialist regime, and the strong military bond with the
Soviet Union, President Sadat issued this law in an attempt to attract foreign capital.
Yet, as the articles demonstrated, it is clear that the government approached foreign
capital cautiously and not with open arms. Guarantees against expropriation were
inserted, as well as dispute resolution mechanism through arbitration, in a message to
investors that the new administration was not like the old one. Tax exemptions and
incentives for foreign investment were modest in this law, as Article 5 was the only
one that tackled this subject. Facilities were more extensively provided, but restricted
to the free zones. The law was also lacking in any neoliberal requirements that
indicated openness and the motivation for attracting foreign investors. It is worth
noting here that during the interval of issuing this law, Egypt did not have any
ongoing operations with the IFIs.282
2. The Open-Door Policy and Laws Thereafter
The focus on foreign investment in Egypt started during Sadat’s time in office, when
he promulgated Law No. 43 of 1974 directly after the October war in 1973,283 and
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three years after his first investment law of 1971.284 Subsequently, two laws were
issued with regard to investment during Mubarak’s rule, which were Law No. 230 of
1989285 and Law No. 8 of 1997.286 It is worth noting that the three laws followed
almost the same policy in dealing with foreign investments, through the limitation of
investment privileges and guarantees to certain economic sectors.287 Tax holidays and
duty exemptions were the forms of incentive that these laws offered. The analysis
between these laws will be based on the indicators indicated earlier.
a) Protections and Guarantees Against Expropriation
In this regard, Article 7 of Law No. 43 of 1974 prohibited nationalization,
confiscation, or the guardianship of invested projects except through judicial
authorization.288 Article 8 of Law No. 230 of 1989 stipulated the same guarantees with
the same exceptions. However, it added that such properties shall not be confiscated
except for public utilities in return for compensation equivalent to its value.
Furthermore, protections against expropriation where indicated within Articles 8, 9,
and 10 within Law No. 8 of 1997. In that regard, the law eliminated both confiscation
for public utility and through judicial authorization. It expressly restricted the
confiscation or nationalization of invested property.289 In addition, both Laws No. 230
of 1989 and 8 of 1997 indicated that the administrative authorities shall not intervene
within the pricing of products, establishments, or determining their profits. Another
guarantee was added by Law No. 8 of 1997 with regard to licensing protection. The
law stipulated that the investor’s licenses, for investment or other utilities, shall not be
revoked by any administrative authority as long as no violation was committed
regarding the licensing conditions.290 Accordingly, the three laws granted protections
for foreign investment projects. Law No. 8 of 1997 offered the highest protection of
the consecutive investment laws since 1953, which indicates governmental interest in
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foreign investment within this period, and growing neoliberal influence in order to
secure the market for foreign capital and investment operations.
b) Dispute Settlement
Article 8 of Law No. 43 of 1974 indicated that disputes shall be settled in accordance
with the agreement with the investor, and/or in accordance with the international
agreements that involve Egypt and the investor’s state as parties, or according to the
ICSID convention which entered into force by Law No. 90 of 1971.291 Article 55 of
Law No. 230 of 1981 indicated the same as the previous article.292 The only addition
was the insertion of domestic arbitration as a dispute settlement option.293 In addition
to the above, Law No. 8 of 1997 added three additional sections with regard to dispute
resolution mechanisms with foreign investors. The first was through a petition
committee, the second was a ministerial dispute resolution committee, and the third
was a ministerial committee for investment contract disputes.294 These committees
were empowered to resolve investment disputes in an attempt to accelerate the dispute
settlement process and to avoid international arbitration.295 These additional
mechanisms demonstrated the multiple options that the state provided for dispute
settlement during the 1990s. Such diverse dispute settlement mechanisms emphasized
the government’s willingness to solve investment conflicts in whichever manner fits
the interests of the investor.
c) Tax Holidays and Duty Exemptions
The three laws offered a wide range of tax holidays and duty exemption bundles for
different intervals. Article 16 of Law No. 43 of 1974 indicated that such exemptions
should last for five years, or up to eight years, depending on the significance of the
project for public utility.296 On a different note, Articles 11 to 16 of Law No. 230 of
1989 stipulated the privileges of the law in that regard. It offered greater tax holidays
and duty exemptions compared to its predecessor.297 The law also extended the
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interval for these exemptions, as it indicated that the exemption should be for five
years and could be extended for another equal interval for public utility interests. It
also stipulated that the exemptions could last for ten years if the projects were founded
within one of the new industrial areas, new urban communities, or in a remote
location.298 Law No. 8 of 1997 offered the same period of exemption in a similar
manner to the earlier one with regard to investment within and outside of the new
regions. However, a separate section was dedicated for the purpose of tax holidays
within Law No. 8 of 1997. From Articles 16 to 27, the law stipulated the different
types of exemptions that the foreign investor might enjoy. It also extended the
duration for these exemptions to twenty years for investments outside the “Old
Valley”.299 Thus, law No. 8 of 1997 provided foreign investors with the largest bundle
of exemptions, on the one hand, and on the other, it offered the longest duration for
tax holidays. The gradual increase in incentives reflects how the government was
committed to the implementation of neoliberal adjustments through the
encouragement of investment.
d) Real Estate Ownership
In this regard, Law No. 43 of 1974 did not indicate the possibility for foreign investors
to own real estate within Egypt. However, Article 19 indicated that the administrative
buildings created through the rules of this law are not subjected to the normal leasing
law,300 which indicates that foreign investors are allowed to rent property. Whereas, in
Law No. 230 of 1989, the only difference in this subject was indicated within Article
17 with regard to the projects of land reclamation if it took the form of a joint stock
company, after cabinet approval.301 However, Article 12 of Law No. 8 of 1997
granted foreign investors the right to own real estate, such as land and buildings.302
The switch in foreign ownership policy affirms governmental openness to foreign
investors as an important economic partner.
e) Foreign Capital Transfer
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Law No. 43 of 1974 stipulated, within Article 21, the means by which the investor
shall transfer his capital outside the state. The law required that such transfers occur
after a period of five years of it reaching the state, by five equal installments per year,
and after the approval of the investment agency board.303 In addition, Article 22
outlined the criteria upon which the board shall decide the possibility of such capital
transfers.304 In the same regard, Article No. 22 of Law No. 230 of 1989 stipulated that
the investor could transfer all the profits, or a part thereof, within the limits of their
foreign currency debit account.305 Article 23 of the same law restricted transferring the
capital in its entirety. It stipulated that the allowed limit is equivalent to the value of
the project after its liquidation, and by five equal annual installments.306 The only
exception in this regard was if the investor’s foreign currency debit account was with
one of the banks registered with the Egyptian Central Bank and had an amount
equivalent to the desired transfer; otherwise the approval of the investment agency
board would be required.307 Nevertheless, Articles 10 and 10.1 of Law No. 8 of 1997
did not restrict the transfer of capital without prejudice to the rights of the third
party.308 Once more, it is clear how gradual the process of eliminating restrictions on
capital transfers was. Such a shift reflects the government’s gradual acceptance of the
mobility of capital as an essential requirement for foreign investments and commercial
operations in a free market.
f) Investment Treaties
As indicated earlier, Egypt became one of the top 6 countries in the world for
concluding BITs in order to encourage foreign investments.309 Many of these BITs
were concluded during the 1990s and the implementation of the ERSAP.310 In
addition, the investment law No. 8 of 1997 indicated clearly the importance of
honoring international investment agreements. Moreover, it indicated ICSID as a
dispute resolution mechanism for investment disputes even if there was not a BIT that
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stipulates so explicitly.311 In that regard, it is important to indicate that Egypt is among
the countries which was most subjected to ICSID arbitrations, totaling 32 cases.312
As demonstrated, despite the gradual elimination of restrictions and the increase in
incentives starting from 1974 to 1997 in response to neoliberal requirements for an
opened and deregulated market, the amount of foreign investment that came to Egypt
during this period was disappointing. Many factors – other than investment legal
provisions – had an influence and caused the reluctance of foreign investors. These
factors could be summarized as follows: (i) the conflict between Egypt and Israel,
especially in the 1970s; (ii) the lack of trust in the government because of previous
nationalization attempts; (iii) the lack of trust in the government and its unreliable
bureaucracy;313 (iv) the lack of industrial power to produce and export; (v) the
inability of the Egyptian market to meet competition at the international level, and;314
(vi) the quick implementation of market liberalization that was more than the
Egyptian private sector could handle.315 In spite of being a member of ICSID, the
GATT, and the WTO, investors were not keen to invest within the newly-liberalized
Egyptian market. However, and due to engagement with the international neoliberal
market, the Egyptian economy became a vulnerable one with nothing to offer, and
willing to accept anything.316
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Table 1:Review of Egyptian Investment Laws
Indicators

a) Protection
and
guarantees
against
expropriation

b) Dispute
settlement

c) Tax holidays
and duty
exemptions

d) Real estate
ownership

e) Foreign
capital
transfers

f) Investment
treaties that
entered into
force

Law No.
156 of 1953
and its
amendment
by
Law No.
475 of 1954

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Law No. 65
of 1971

Yes, with
exceptions for
public utility,
and in
exchange for
fair
compensation
in 6 months.
Yes, except
by judicial
authorization.

Domestic
arbitration.

Minimal,
specified for the
free zones, except
for Article 5 that
indicates a 5-year
tax exemption on
profits.

N/A

Restricted by
Articles 7, 8,
9, and 10

Only one
investment
treaty with
Kuwait in 1966
(terminated).

According to
mutual
agreement,
international
agreements,
domestic
arbitration, or
ICSID.

More than the
previous laws,
with a 5-year
exemption that
was extendable to
8 years for public
utility.

N/A, only
regulated
renting

Restricted by
a lapse of 5
years by five
instalments,
and after the
acceptance of
the
Investment
Agency
Board.

Yes, with
exceptions for
the sake of
public utility,
and through
judicial
authorization
in exchange
for fair
compensation.

According to
mutual
agreement,
international
agreements,
domestic
arbitration
before the
Cairo
Regional
Centre, or
ICSID.

More than the
previous law, with
a 5-year
exemption that
was extendable
for an equal
duration, and 10
years for
investments in
new or remote
regions.

Limited to
land
reclamation
and restricted
by cabinet
approval.

Expressly
restricted
expropriation
or
confiscation
of foreign
investment
assets and
property.

All of the
above, in
addition to
three newlyestablished
governmental
committees
for the speedy
settlement of
disputes, and
the avoidance
of
international
arbitration.

Included more tax
holidays than the
previous laws, the
same exemptions
as Law No. 230 of
1989, and
increased the
period of
exemption to 20
years for
investments
outside the Old
Valley.

Granted the
right for
foreign
investors to
own real
estate.

The amount of
the transfer is
restricted by
the amount of
foreign
currency in
the investor’s
debit account,
equivalent to
the value of
the project
after
liquidation,
and by 5
annual
instalments.
No
restrictions
without
prejudice to
any thirdparty rights.

Law

Law No. 43
of 1974 and
its
amendment
by
Law No. 32
of 1977

Law No.
230 of 1989

Law No. 8
of 1997
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114 BITs
entered into
force after the
Open-Door
policy, only 15
of them before
the
implementation
of the ERSAP
program, and 99
BITs enforced
after its
implementation.

E. Institutional Practice as an Objective of the Rule of Law in Egypt
The above sections demonstrated the legislative transformation that took place after
the Open-Door policy and the shift toward a neoliberal market-oriented economy. The
focus on this section will be on the behavior of the Egyptian legal institutions,
represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), toward these neoliberal
changes. The practices of legal institutions are one of the main elements of the rule of
law for the neoliberal paradigm.317 Because of its importance, the World Bank spent
$3.8 billion on judicial reforms within developing countries.318 Shihata, the General
Counsel of the World Bank, emphasized the importance of institutional reforms for
the private sector’s development.319 In addition to the legislative aspect, Shihata
further indicated that legal institutions participate in creating the legal matrix within
which the system operates. Moreover, he illustrated how such institutional practices
promote harmonization between legal reforms and the market, which eventually will
promote democratization.320
In this regard, the establishment of a constitutional court in Egypt took two phases.
The first was during 1969, while the second was in 1979. In the beginning, it was
named the Supreme Court. The Court was not fully independent of the authoritarian
political system back then.321 Unlike the previous court, the SCC, which was renamed
in 1979, had a different system of appointing its judges and was independent of the
political system.322 The establishment of the Court at this phase was part of a political
maneuver by the government in dealing with the aftermath of the riots that took place
in 1977 against economic changes.323 The political leadership’s objective was to
dismantle the socialist economic foundations that Nasser established through the
Court’s rulings within the areas of housing, privatization, and land reform.324
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The Court had a great role and influence on the shape of the political, social, and
economic environment in Egypt, especially during Mubarak’s rule.325 The Court
started to become engaged through its rulings in sensitive political matters starting in
1999, although its influential rulings began in 1995.326 In 1992, the Court started to
become more liberalized and progressive through the adoption of an international
approach.327 The Court began to rely on foreign court judgments and incorporate them
within its rulings, such as from the United States Constitutional Court.328 The Court
recognized the international conventions that Egypt was member of, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of
Economics.329 The Court began to employ these international conventions within its
interpretations and rulings, which was not counted in the governmental calculations.
As a consequence, there were many confrontations between the Court and the
government with regard to political, social, and economic affairs.330
Within the economic development sphere and the neoliberal project in Egypt, the
Court had a great role in enabling the privatization program. There were many
constitutional constraints that could have led to the abortion of the privatization
process. Initially, Article 4 of the Egyptian Constitution stipulated that
[t]he economic foundation of the Arab Republic of Egypt is the
socialist democratic system based on sufficiency and justice, in a
manner preventing exploitation, narrowing the gap between incomes,
protecting legitimate earnings and guaranteeing justice in the
distribution of public responsibilities and expenditures.331
As demonstrated, and in contradiction to the neoliberal market ideology, the article
explicitly indicated that the economic system of the state is a socialist one. In addition,
the article prescribed the role of the state in the economic sphere and mandated it to
ensure the just distribution of income and the prevention of the exploitation of its
assets.
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Moreover, and with regard to the protection of the state’s ownership of economic
utilities, Article 30 of the constitution stipulated that
[p]ublic ownership is the ownership of the people and it is confirmed
by the continuous support of the public sector. The public sector be
the vanguard of progress in all spheres and shall assume the main
responsibility in the development plan.332
In addition, Article 33 of the constitution stipulated that
[p]ublic ownership shall have its sanctity. Its protection and support
shall be the duty of every citizen in accordance with the law as it is
considered the mainstay of the strength of the homeland, a basis for
the socialist system and a source of prosperity for the people.333
What is more, Article 59 stated that “[s]afeguarding, consolidating, and preserving the
socialist gains shall be a national duty.”334 The articles expressed the sanctity of public
ownership, and it granted every citizen the right to defend it as a national duty; which
raises another issue with regard to how the people perceived such change. The Nasser
era policies had many supporters within the Egyptian population at the time. They
were against the privatization project, since for them it represented the opposite of
nationalization,335 and at the same time the core governmental objective was to move
towards a market-oriented system.336 On a different front, the state had to decrease
publicly owned enterprises since they became a great burden on the state’s budget, as
the IMF and the World Bank highlighted. In order to handle such a challenge, the
Court had to employ a very wide scope of interpretation for what was to be considered
“public sector”.
The Court had to manipulate the explicit meaning of the text by adopting a very
liberal interpretation that was contemporary to the ongoing economic development
process. 337 Accordingly, the Court twisted constitutional articles in order to recognize
the privatization law as constitutional.338 In that regard, and in an interview conducted
with Chief Justice Awad Al Murr, he indicated that
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[t]he constitution in its plain terms said the public sector is dominant
and it has to command the process of development in Egypt… Could
the court accept this? The public sector is proved to be a complete
failure... Everything was wrong with the public sector. It failed in
administration. It failed in providing revenues. It failed in every
aspect of its life.339
He further added that
[t]he World Bank said that the only solution was to amend the
constitution but the government was unwilling. The court faced the
real problem. Either Egypt was to move ahead or retreat backward,
such was the case when we made our decision... and we have to
interpret the constitution in a way that will pave the way for
privatization.340
It is clear in Al Murr’s words how the Court was trapped between what they deemed
to be right and what was the best for the country; between their duty and limits as
judges to respect the acts of law, and their duty as Egyptians toward their country. It is
also obvious how he was convinced by the opinion of the World Bank that a change
must take place through changing the constitution, which was a hard decision to take
by the government because of the political circumstances back then. Accordingly, he
attempted to make that change along with other court members.
Furthermore, it is evident how Chief Justice Al Murr was extremely liberal in his
explanation of the situation and to the Court’s actions. He continued in his interview,
saying that
What is seen at the time to be a step for progress could be seen the
other way around at another time... the government must have
alternatives for investing its money in directions pertinent to the
public interest... instead of a public sector, which has been considered
by the constitution as the only method of development, the court said
that the method of development could not be restrained by a specific
method, even if it is stated by the constitution… without this, no
proper decision would ever happen and the economy in Egypt would
have stayed as it was, incapable of advancement.341
In stressing his opinion, he further stated that
a constitutional provision is a living creature. It cannot be interpreted
in any way that will impede our society. Impediments in our society
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cannot have tools within our constitution... That is why, despite the
fact that the ruling was a complete deviation of the terms of the
constitution, it is a ruling in the light of our legitimate aspiration. So
whatever criticism I have been made against this ruling I will never
regret what we have done. It was not only fair, but it is required as a
necessity in our society.342
The tendency of the Chief Justice was clear toward changing what the constitution
stipulated. He and other Court members preformed a legislative role, clearly, through
ruling against the stipulations of the Constitution. In theory, the Egyptian economy
remained a socialist one; yet in practice, it was a neoliberal one thanks to this ruling.
What the Court did was a practical application of what Felix Cohen illustrated in his
article, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach. Law is what courts
do, and not what the articles stipulate; since influences, whether political, social,
religious, or economical, determine in a significant way the outcome of the rulings
which make it predictable.343 If it was not, the government would not have risked
leaving the survival of the privatization policy in the hands of the SCC; since if the
Court ruled otherwise, it would have marked a possible end to the program. As Abo
Oudeh deduced, the Court was left to take the blame for the results of the program,
and the government proceeded with its neoliberal market plans as prescribed by the
IFIs.344 In addition, this confirms and interprets the neoliberal insistence on the
importance of the rule of law, on both the legislative and institutional fronts.
However, it is important to note in that regard that the Court was not liberal in that
ruling only, or just with regard economic concerns. The Court adopted the liberal and
wide text interruptions in many other incidents, which some was regarded as political
and human rights concerns.345
The Court ruled against the government in many political incidents, since the market
was the one liberalized and not the political administration. Such active rulings took
place in parallel intervals to the structural adjustment program from 1991 to 1997. In
that regard, the Court had many rulings with regard to the protection of social and
political rights, in response to the expansion in the use of preventative arrest that the
government undertook, and subjecting civilians to military trials through Law No. 97
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of 1992.346 In addition, and with regard to press liberation, the Court struck down
articles within the Egyptian criminal procedures code that dealt with libel cases.347
The court invoked Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the principles of justice that are shared by all civilized nations in the labor party
newspaper case, were the editor was liable for libeling the Minister of Petroleum.348
As for human rights, the Court’s practices managed to enhance the work of many
human rights organizations in Egypt within the previously indicated period, such as
the Cairo Institute for Human Rights, the Center for Human Rights Legal Aid, and the
Hisham Mubarak Center for Legal Aid.349
Nevertheless, and as previously demonstrated, the rule of law has been one of the
foundational requirements for neoliberal development since the 1970s. It aims to
reform national laws and legal institutional practices in order to safeguard liberalized
markets and free trade from governmental interferences that might disrupt ongoing
operations. The Egyptian example was a demonstration of the application of the rule
of law in a developing country through adopting the ERSAP program prescribed by
the World Bank and the IMF. The Egyptian government implemented the required
legislative changes, in spite of their being contrary to the Constitution. Marketoriented regulations had been enacted and implemented as a formalist structure for
market operations.
Both the new market-oriented regulations and the government had the required
institutional support needed for enforcing these laws. As previously mentioned, the
state would not have implemented the privatization plan without the extremely activist
rulings that the SCC rendered due to the public resistance it faced. However, despite
such major legislative and institutional behavior changes in the rule of law and its
implementation, the economic situation did not improve as was anticipated. This
asserts how the neoliberal approach in economic development influenced the Egyptian
legislative structure as an outcome of implementing the IFIs Structural Adjustment
Programs. It also highlights the degree of significance of the rule of law in realizing
economic development and growth. Indeed, it might be essential, but not as significant
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for development as it was claimed to be. This indicates that there are far more
essential aspects to consider rather than the rule of law, at least in the case of Egypt.
F. Evaluation of the Egyptian case:
As demonstrated, and unlike the previously covered Asian examples, Egypt became
dependent on the IFIs for economic assistance and support. Such a partnership began
with caution after the riots that took place in the 1970s. Later, it became inescapable
because of the budget imbalances at the end of the 1980s. The purpose of the ERSAP
program was mainly to reduce the pressure foreign debts placed on the national
budget. The idea behind the program was simple: To cut public spending and
subsidies, and to pay foreign debts. The social effects were disregarded while
implementing the program, as poverty levels increased dramatically after the
implementation of the program.350 In fact, it elevated the poverty rate from 21% in
1990 to 44% in 1996.351 Furthermore, the prices of major commodities and energy
products increased, while wages and salaries decreased as a result of a reduction in
public spending by as much as 15%.352
The program managed to decrease foreign debt to a great extent. However, it failed to
attain the expected foreign capital returns. Despite the privatization of more than a
third of public enterprises, the privatization policy neither attracted enough foreign
investments nor increased Egypt’s market share among the developing states.353 This
is not surprising, since Egypt had not been an important destination for foreign
investment from the beginning,354 despite being one of the most eager developing
countries in negotiating agreements with regard to investment.355 Economic returns
from international endeavors through joining the GATT in 1970, ICSID in 1972, and
undertaking the necessary regulatory adjustments for joining the WTO in 1995 were
very weak.
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Additionally, the privatization program did not contribute to any increase in the
country’s exports despite initial postulations.356 Furthermore, and aside from the
privatization program, the investment returns were very minimal as demonstrated in
the figures below. Despite the transformation into a neoliberal economy, and the
adherence to the rule of law as instructed by the IMF and the World Bank, Egypt
remained a rentier economic model in reality.357 The main resources of income almost
remained the same. The only economic difference was the selling off of public
enterprises to acquire money to pay foreign debts. The effects of the IMF stabilization
program on Egypt were similar to some extent to what happened to the Asian
countries in the 1997 crisis.358 The objectives of the IMF’s strategies were similar
with regard to safeguarding foreign debts and investments regardless of the effects on
the developing states’ economies.
After the implementation of the program, the Egyptian pound collapsed against the
US Dollar, the government budget was reduced, and the supply of money sharply
decreased.359 Even the essentiality of such procedures was questioned, since the public
sector was not losing money in the manner described prior to privatization. 260 out of
314 state-owned enterprises were making profits, and only 54 were making losses; the
privatization process might have gone better if it sold off those losing enterprises
only.360 After the program’s implementation, gross domestic investment dropped from
28% of GDP in 1980 to 19% in 1998.361 Meanwhile, the increase in investment during
the period between 1990 and 1997 was only 2.7%, in comparison to the 7.2% of
middle-income countries, and 12.7% in East Asian countries.362
Such indicators prove the irrelevance of the rule of law and its implementation on the
one hand, and attracting investments or increasing economic growth on the other. In
that respect, when the World Bank was confronted by such disappointing results
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within the developing states, the response was that it was up to the investors.363
Accordingly, the structural changes implemented rendered the Egyptian economy
vulnerable to international forces, besides walking into the same economic trap as
South Africa, and becoming a locked-in economy without achieving real economic
gains.

Figure 3: Flow of Real 'Non-Petroleum Greenfield FDI' to Egypt for the period 1972-2009 (in EGP billion at
constant 1982 prices)364

Figure 4: FDI inflows to Egypt as % of GDP (1973-2003)365
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Figure 5: FDI Inflows to Egypt as a Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formulation 1973-2003366

Figure 6: Egypt's Share of World FDI Inflows (1975-2003)367
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V.

Conclusion

This study highlighted how questionable the neoliberal model was in Egypt
specifically, and in developing countries in general. It outlined how this economic
model was coercively implemented within developing states through the different
forces of globalization and through IFI conditionality. Such economic policies ensured
Western dominance over the global economic system, which resembled another form
of economic colonization. The liberal market approach was suitable for the economic
capabilities of the developed states. However, that neither makes it necessarily an
ideal one, nor a universally successful model, especially given that the current
economic order is a Western product which favors its creators. On the one hand, such
a biased system hindered developing states’ efforts towards a better economic future.
On the other hand, it evoked embedded colonial sensitivity within those developing
countries because of being subjected to a double-standard economic system.368
The developing states in the current international economic order are being cornered
into submitting to the economic demands and conditions of the developed ones, since
they do not possess the required bargaining power to alter the system to become more
balanced or at least to give more respect to social rights. Furthermore, the role of the
IFIs and their recent interferences within the developing states’ political systems
through conditionality is another nail in the coffin of the developing states’
economies. As demonstrated in the Egyptian case, developing states lose part of their
economic policy independence through successively coercive interferences, either
through the IFIs or other effective international organizations, such as the WTO. The
developing states are being pressured to make their economies vulnerable to different
foreign economic fluctuations in the interests of the developed. Their economies were
integrated into the developed countries’ economies with regard to debt repayments,
capital transfers, and resource allocation and distribution. The IFIs, from the other
side, ensured the security and stability of such a system through their economic
policies by ensuring the due payment of foreign debts, the enrollment in international
trade conventions, and the developing market’s openness to the free flow of capital
and investments.

368

See, supra note 1.

78

Such economic dominance was achieved and maintained by the different integrations
of the rule of law as a foundational element for economic development. As illustrated,
the interaction of law and development took many forms across the different periods.
In each, the rule of law appeared to be serving different developmental purposes.
However, it did not accomplish the desired developmental role that it was expected to
perform within these developing countries, which raised postulations regarding the
objectives behind its employment from the beginning. Yet, I believe it was the price
that the developing states had to pay in return for financial assistance. Nonetheless,
the implementation of the rule of law, as an economic cure in the manner prescribed
by the IFIs, furthered the economic suffering of the developing states, and increased
the inequalities and poverty levels in their communities.
The Egyptian case in that regard showed the consequences of the implementation of
the ERSAP. It managed to fulfil the needs related to foreign interests while
completely ignoring social effects within the community. Despite adhering to the
regulative and institutional requirements (the liberalized market, opening up to foreign
investments, and establishing free trade), economic gains were minimal. These were
not the proper solutions for Egypt’s economic problems. The neoliberal policy did not
even manage to secure the required income from these sources as a substitute for
cutting state spending. This affirms that the rule of law is not as significant as it was
thought to be, and not even close to how neoliberal marketing would have one
believe.
Finally, in order to ensure the sustainability of the economic order, I believe that
second thought should be given to the economic interventions’ liabilities, whether it
be committed by states, international organizations, or even international enterprises.
What are the acceptable limits for such interventions, and why is it not regulated as
much as military and human rights ones? That is, if it is to be regarded as an
intervention in the first place, in the international legal sense. People die, starve,
become sick, and even commit atrocities because of economic needs and interests. A
clearer threshold is required in order to at least control global economic influences,
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until that time comes when the international community realizes how to run a
globally-integrated economy.369
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